Interest‐based bargaining: efficient, amicable and wise?

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to draw on previous research and propose a framework for evaluating interest‐based bargaining (IBB) around three criteria: efficient, amicable and wise, where mutual gains are not self‐evident.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper reviews both survey and case study research on IBB in the USA and Canada. Based on trends discerned in the data, the paper uses the three criteria to present research and propositions on evaluating the IBB process.

Findings

IBB connects front stage acts by negotiators during collective bargaining with backstage environments and fosters collaboration hinging on dialogue across competing values involving online and offline processes during negotiations. Where mutual gains are not self evident, there these findings underpin criteria for evaluating the IBB process’s potential to serve enduring values of industrial democracy and employee voice and the newer values of collaboration and partnership in strategic decision making.

Research limitations/implications

The amicable criterion predisposes the framework favorably towards amicable relations, which creates a favorable bias within the framework towards the IBB process when compared to other bargaining processes. There is a need for updated quantitative data on IBB trends at a national level, similar to the three FMCS surveys last reported in 2004, and a need for institutional linkages that will increase case study research on IBB, similar to recent research on Kaiser Permanente.

Practical implications

Negotiators, trainers and policy makers will gain from the criteria listed here to evaluate IBB where mutual gains are not self‐evident.

Originality/value

The framework presented in the paper advances an original framework to evaluate IBB.

Citation

Michael, B. and Michael, R. (2013), "Interest‐based bargaining: efficient, amicable and wise?", Employee Relations, Vol. 35 No. 5, pp. 460-478. https://doi.org/10.1108/ER-10-2011-0057