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Viewpoint: why variable pay-for-performance in healthcare can backfire: Evidence from psychological economics

Margit Osterloh (Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Germany, Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland and CREMA (Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts), Zurich, Switzerland)

Evidence-based HRM

ISSN: 2049-3983

Article publication date: 13 May 2014

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Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this “viewpoint” is to consider the unintended consequences of variable pay and incentive schemes in healthcare environments.

Design/methodology/approach

Reviews a series of side effects of incentives.

Findings

The paper suggests that pay-for-performance schemes should be avoided.

Originality/value

The area of public sector boards is undergoing considerable change in the UK and this paper, although preliminary, is one of the few to examine the links to motivation.

Keywords

Citation

Osterloh, M. (2014), "Viewpoint: why variable pay-for-performance in healthcare can backfire: Evidence from psychological economics", Evidence-based HRM, Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 120-123. https://doi.org/10.1108/EBHRM-12-2013-0037

Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2014, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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