General Ne Win: A Political Biography

Citation

Robert H. Taylor (2016), "General Ne Win: A Political Biography", Asian Education and Development Studies, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 355-358. https://doi.org/10.1108/AEDS-08-2015-0037

Robert H. Taylor is a prominent scholar among those who study Myanmar. General Ne Win is an excellent, comprehensive and voluminous book which clearly illuminates the largely unknown life of one of the most enigmatic and controversial leaders of Myanmar and, more widely, of Southeast Asia. In 1987, the author wrote The State in Burma, which was revised in 2009, and was an analysis of the country’s politics, which charted its development from dynastic times to the establishment of a one-party socialist state by Ne Win in 1962.

Professor Taylor details Ne Win’s life from his birth to his role in the emergent politico-military force, the Burma Independence Army, on through Burma’s independence from Britain in January 1948 and then to the coup d’état of March 2, 1962. He goes on to examine Ne Win’s years leading the government between 1958 and 1988. This period in power rightly represents around 40 percent of the biography.

Ne Win (1910-2002), was born into an educated middle-class Burmese Chinese family in a small village near Paungdale, in Pyay District, Bago. Originally known as Shu Maung, there were claims that he was descended from the son of King Bodawpaya, who was sent in 1785 to invade and annex Arakan (now known as Rakhine).

In 1941, Ne Win was one of the Thirty Comrades who traveled to Hainan, China, to receive military training from the Japanese. As one of the Thirty, he decided to adopt his Burmese nom de guerre, Ne Win which means “brilliant as the sun,” or more accurately (according to Taylor) “bright Sun.”

The relationship between Ne Win and Aung San is an important one for Burmese history. Taylor addresses it as best as he can, writing that Ne Win “did not display any sign of disloyalty, in words and deeds to his commander [Aung San]” (p. 54). However, a contestable case otherwise was made by Brigadier-General Maung Shwe, latterly known as Comrade Bo Kyaw Zaw, who died in Kunming in 2012, and claimed from a standpoint of intimacy with his other Thirty Comrades that “Ne Win and Aung San quarreled frequently during their training.”

After the departure from Burma of the last Japanese troops, Colonel Ne Win and a part of the Burma National Army entered Rangoon ahead of the British on May 1, 1945. A few days later, on May 7, 1945, Ne Win demonstrated his interest in political power and gave a forewarning of his future significance by broadcasting to the people of Burma speaking in both English and Burmese (pp. 66, 565-569).

In that speech, made at a critical historical juncture for his nation, Ne Win described his belief in the importance of the Burma National Army thus: “We have been able to combat the Japanese in Upper Burma and Arakan and defeat them thoroughly […] I think I have made it clear enough that the Burmese Army is not only the hope of the country, but its very life soul.”

Taylor includes this speech at the end of his biography letting readers judge Ne Win by it for themselves.

On the May 10, 1945, during a first and rare press conference, Ne Win’s calmness, and his combination of insight and charm impressed Harry Hopkins, a British journalist and writer on Southeast Asia, who is rightly quoted by Taylor. Was it the case that Ne Win “was (simply) courting the good will of the British” in 1945, as well as in 1960, in order to position himself to take power in 1962? Ne Win’s meeting with Pakistan’s Field Marshal Md Ayub Khan, as well as his quote that “Napoleon may have started with good intentions but he became enamoured with power” (p. 373), are interesting to study in this regard. Was Ne Win’s criticism of the French Emperor a result of Ne Win’s fondness for the British, or does Taylor think that Ne Win initially had good intentions which were corrupted?

Before independence, on December 12, 1948, Colonel Ne Win was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General, “in charge of the Northern Command” (p. 102), which included Arakan. In 1963, Ne Win supervised the activities of Md Jafar Habib, who established the Rohingyas Independence Force on the border of East Pakistan (p. 284).

In early 1949, Ne Win began his rise to power as Vice-Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Home Affairs, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. In 1958, Ne Win became de facto Prime Minister (p. 207).

Ne Win’s “socialism” has also added to the sense of him having an enigmatic personality. After a long period of anti-government protests, when the announcement of his bloodless coup was made “nothing was said about socialism” (p. 258). In fact, it seems that the concept of “socialism” had no particular meaning for Ne Win except as a function for organizing and controlling Burmese society.

Ne Win came to power thanks to his command of the military and his consequent ability to control public protests, but he also fell because of protests. Following full-scale public demonstrations in March 1988, Ne Win resigned from the Burma Socialist Programme Party. On July 23, he simply said: “I have decided to resign.” Then he asked the Central Committee Headquarters Secretary, Htway Han to read out the following statement.

“I am not totally free from responsibility even if indirectly for the sad events that took place in March and June and because I am advancing in age. I would like to request Party members to allow me to relinquish the duty of Party Chairman.”

Although Ne Win had formally retired upon stepping down from office, he held onto a part of his power. However, “one heard little of his views after 1988, just rumors that he was still controlling the government.” Some changes were made to move Myanmar on from the policies around which Ne Win had organized his revolution. Ne Win had said he was “convinced that only an authoritarian socialist government can push through the economic and social revolution which is needed to unite the people.” Ne Win’s version of authoritarian socialism had been marked by his determined economic isolationism. However, latterly, the economy was opened again to foreign investment.

There is no monument to Ne Win in Myanmar. As the author notes, “many still abominate him and his memory” (p. 562). He died, under house arrest, at his Inya Lake villa, near Yangon, on December 5, 2002.

Daw Khin Sanda Win, his daughter, who was released from house arrest in December 2008, and U. Pyo Win, his youngest son, kindly and comprehensively answered the author’s questions in preparation for his work. This academic methodology has led to an impressive understanding of Ne Win’s personality and his “socialism.” Interviews with Daw Ni Ni Myint, Ne Win’s wife, a history professor at the University of Yangon, are not mentioned as having been undertaken; she was probably not accessible to the author. Taylor does note, though, that she is a “distant relative of Daw Katy Ba Than,” Ne Win’s previous Anglo-Burmese wife (p. 422).

Daw Ni Ni Myint’s role, between 1972 and 1988, was essential but has gone rather undocumented. Without an interview with her it is impossible to know more, and Facebook is almost useless as a source of further information about her past political role. Her intellectual capacity probably complemented Ne Win’s character. Major-General Bertram Temple, Head of the British Services Mission to Burma, commented that, during his rise to power, Ne Win had: “Personal magnetism and charm combined with ruthlessness and determination […] and that he was ‘quick and intelligent’” (p. 126). The Japanese officers in charge of Ne Win’s military training also found him “unusually quick in understanding” both practical skills and theoretical subjects.

Outstanding scholars, such as Ian Brown, read and commented on the entire manuscript for Professor Taylor’s study. Academics, archivists and librarians from Myanmar to Washington, and London to South Korea contributed to this great work.

Ne Win’s travels made for important landmarks in his political life to track and analyze. “He travelled the world for business and pleasure,” writes Taylor (p. 160). In 1956, Ne Win traveled to the Middle East and South Asia. He met President Nasser, visited military bases and also toured places of interest during his ten days in Egypt. From Cairo he flew to Karachi and met Ayub Khan to discuss the thorny problem for Myanmar and Pakistan of the Rakhine border. It is interesting to note, as mentioned by Taylor, that Khan conducted his successful bloodless coup later in 1958 at the same time as Ne Win became caretaker leader of the government of Myanmar. During this trip Ne Win also flew to Delhi where he met Prime Minister Nehru.

1960 involved extensive travels to the USA, Great Britain, West Germany and China (p. 238). It would be impossible to recount all the numerous trips mentioned in the biography here. However, Taylor notes a curious January 28, 1969 meeting between Ne Win and the then President Ayub Khan which lasted “for two hours” during a four-day visit to Pakistan. Sadly, it is impossible now to know exactly the reason for this trip, but as it involved meetings “with Chinese diplomats,” it is one of the more noteworthy of Ne Win’s recorded visits abroad.

Ne Win and Daw Ni Ni Myint, accompanied by various ministers, set off on Ne Win’s “last trip to Europe and the West” (p. 520) on April 11, 1988, and it was concentrated mainly in Munich and Zurich. Ne Win’s very last journeys were made for medical treatments such as those he made to Singapore in January 1994 and September 1998.

His last important “political” trip, to visit Indonesia’s President Suharto in September 1997, was made with his daughter Daw Khin Sanda Win and her family.

Ne Win’s interest in travel and diplomacy was already apparent by the time he got to Hainan during the Second World War. There he acted as a “mediator” for the Thirty Comrades (p. 30). China was evidently of great importance to him. Taylor has documented five of Ne Win’s six official visits to China. The diplomatic power of Ne Win’s cordiality was evident. (He was friendly with Lord Mountbatten of Burma, e.g. whose relationship to the British Royal Family smoothed the issuing of an invitation for Ne Win to lunch with Her Majesty The Queen on July 5, 1960.)

In September 1955, Ne Win led “a thirteen-man delegation” of Burma’s senior military officials which had “unexpected” consequences for the future. Ne Win was in Beijing from “24 to 29 January 1960,” during which visit he signed “two agreements, a treaty of non-aggression and a border agreement” (p. 233) with the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai.

Between July 24 and August 31, 1965, Ne Win traveled to Beijing and met Chairman Mao at the Grand Hall of the People (p. 328). During his visit between August 6 and 12, 1971, Ne Win met Mao again. On November 11, 1974 he made another official visit to the People’s Republic. Between November 11 and 15, 1975, in Beijing, he had an audience with Chairman Mao and signed another agreement of non-aggression between the two countries.

Ne Win met the Chinese leaders Zhou Enlai (“he liked him but did not trust him”) and Deng Xiaoping frequently. On November 14, 1978, he and Daw Ni Ni Myint had “a four-hour meeting and lunch” in Yangon with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (pp. 184, 464). Ne Win visited Laos from October 22 to 24, 1979 and he visited Cambodia once.

An extensive bibliography mainly in English, but also including biographies of Burmese leaders such as Comrade Thakin Bo Let Ya and studies of the BSSP, completes the book. The family photographs included are unique.

The book’s tables are very useful for readers, such as that which lists the Thirty Comrades who secretly left Burma in 1941 and returned in mid-1942, after training to prepare for Burma’s independence in Hainan. Equally important was the well-presented list of the “Initial Members of the Revolutionary Council” who were the brains behind Ne Win’s power structure after his coup.

Ne Win was not an economist. Economic training for military leaders was not a priority for the Japanese on Hainan Island. Consequently, Ne Win’s lack of policies, in particular concerning the economy, turned the Burmese people to poverty. Ne Win’s isolationist regime eventually drained the country’s economy. Unlike his Vietnamese contemporary, Võ Nguyên Giáp, who studied Napoleon’s battles so well and remained a general all his life, Ne Win made clear in his speech of 1945 that he wanted to be a politician. As a politician, we could say that he failed. However, as mentioned by Taylor at the end of his biography, quoting Nakanishi, as a general between 1958 and 1988 the secret of Ne Win’s success was “the control over the personnel of the armed forces and regular reassignment of members of the officer corps before retiring them into the civil administration or economic institutions.” The matter of appointing regional commanders was a very important one for Myanmar. Without an excellent control of his military personnel, it would have been impossible for Ne Win to travel out of the country so often.

Ne Win’s determination to hold onto power, without seeking any new ideological or economic orientation for his country, caused growing discontent. Despite his right decision to abandon direct power in 1988, that lack of core ideals finally ended his long control over Myanmar.

This book is deeply engaging, particularly its “Failure and Farewell” section, which addresses the period from March 1988 to December 2002, and was a terra incognita of lost influence for Ne Win. For Taylor, Ne Win was not just a major figure in Myanmar’s history, “but also in Cold War history.”