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Differentiating control, monitoring and oversight: Influence of power relations on boards of directors – insights from investment fund boards

Margaret M. Cullen (Department of Executive Education, Institute of Banking, Dublin, Ireland)
Niamh M. Brennan (Department of Accountancy, Lochlann Quinn School of Business, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland)

Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal

ISSN: 0951-3574

Article publication date: 16 October 2017

1179

Abstract

Purpose

Boards of directors are assumed to exercise three key accountability roles – control, monitoring and oversight roles. By researching one board type – investment fund boards – and the power relations around those boards, the purpose of this paper is to show that such boards are not capable of operating the three key roles assumed of them.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors conducted 25 in-depth interviews and a focus group session with investment fund directors applying a grounded theory methodology.

Findings

Because of their unique position of power, the authors find that fund promoter organisations (that establish and attract investors to the funds) exercise control and monitoring roles. As a result, contrary to prior assumptions, oversight is the primary role of investment fund boards, rather than the control role or monitoring role associated with corporate boards. The findings can be extended to other board-of-director contexts in which boards (e.g. subsidiary boards, boards of state-owned entities) have legal responsibility but limited power because of power exercised by other parties such as large shareholders.

Practical implications

Shareholders and regulators generally assume boards exercise control and monitoring roles. This can lead to an expectations gap on the part of shareholders and regulators who may not consider the practical realities in which boards operate. This expectations gap compromises the very objective of governance – investor protection.

Originality/value

Based on interviews with investment fund directors, the authors challenge the control-role theory of investment fund boards of directors. Building on our findings, and following subsequent conceptual engagement with the literature, the authors differentiate control, monitoring and oversight roles, terms which are often used interchangeably in prior research. The authors distinguish between the three terms on the basis of the level of influence implied by each.

Keywords

Citation

Cullen, M.M. and Brennan, N.M. (2017), "Differentiating control, monitoring and oversight: Influence of power relations on boards of directors – insights from investment fund boards", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 30 No. 8, pp. 1867-1894. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-12-2015-2345

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2017, Emerald Publishing Limited

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