Federal Systems: Institutional Design and Political Agency

Abstract

If intergovernmental relations are necessary in normal times, it should be even more required to face complex intergovernmental problem (CIP) as the COVID-19 pandemic. However, collaboration between governments depends on institutional rules as well as on political will. To discuss this issue, the analytical model is based on two dimensions: institutional design and political agency. As for the first dimension, since COVID-19 pandemic is considered as a CIP, three aspects are relevant when discussing how federations can organize the coordination between different levels of government: autonomy of subnational governments, mechanisms of coordination, and policy portfolio. As for political agency, the performance of political leadership (national presidents and governors) will be analyzed. The possibility of sharing collective goals across the federation is also a consequence of the political agency that takes place within the institutional systems of each federation. In short, it seeks to analyze the relationship between institutional design and political agency to deal with this CIP in five American federations.

Citation

Peters, B.G., Grin, E. and Abrucio, F.L. (2021), "Federal Systems: Institutional Design and Political Agency", Peters, B.G., Grin, E. and Abrucio, F.L. (Ed.) American Federal Systems and COVID-19, Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 5-22. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-80117-165-620211001