Looking Back at Capital Account Convertibility: India–China Syndrome

Abstract

One of the highly debatable issues in the arena of international economics in recent years is whether a country should go for full capital account convertibility. In terms of the timing and process of capital account liberalization, India and China have been remarkably similar. Both started with a more or less closed capital account in the 1970s and the 1980s, in the context of a heavily state-influenced, planned economy. And in both countries, the first wave of liberalization came in the early 1990s and thus, the journey began. The objective of this chapter is to provide a critical analysis of both India and China's approach to the capital account liberalization program in the backdrop of the recent financial crises and to give an account of the theoretical issues that have arisen in international discussions on CAC and India's standpoint on this issue in particular. Second, how far is the capital account liberalization justified in the context of the recent episodes of financial crises that India and China have witnessed? Using a macroempiric model, this chapter tries to answer whether every member country in the IMF should hurriedly go for CAC or not. In addition, empirically through FMOLS, the authors pool in the “Rupee Convertibility” and “Renminbi Internationalization” along with exchange rate variation and its implications for India's and China's BoP situation (in terms of the export–import position and FDI flows) based on data from 1992 to 2017. ^{1 , 2}

Citation

Mukherjee, S. and Karmakar, A.K. (2019), "Looking Back at Capital Account Convertibility: India–China Syndrome", Bhattacharyya, R. (Ed.) The Gains and Pains of Financial Integration and Trade Liberalization, Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 195-206. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78973-999-220191023