Index
ISBN: 978-1-78973-220-7, eISBN: 978-1-78973-219-1
Publication date: 7 June 2019
This content is currently only available as a PDF
Citation
Fudulu, P. (2019), "Index", The Natural Economic Science, Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 187-193. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78973-219-120191011
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2019 Emerald Publishing Limited
INDEX
Absolute wealth
, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 27, 36, 37, 39, 45, 82, 84, 92, 101, 103, 104, 119, 122, 125, 126, 131, 141, 142, 166, 169n1
Alchian, A. A.
, 159, 179n114
American realism
, 113
Anarchy
, 115–116, 127
Antagonist ends
, 81, 84
Antientropic absorption
, 15
Anti-entropic definition of life
, 3, 33, 36
Anti-entropic movement
, 34, 36, 40, 53
Anti-entropic trapping
, 38, 40
Axiom
, 9–11, 30, 33, 34, 39, 42, 43–46, 164
Barry, N. P.
, 113, 115, 116, 117, 174n71, 175n78
Baumol, W. J.
, 148, 155, 179n113
Becker
, 4, 88, 95, 96, 98, 108, 109, 132, 137, 173n60
Benson, B.
, 147, 155, 157–158, 180n116
Beugelsdijk, S
, 66, 129, 135, 178n100
Boland
, 12, 172n43
Brubaker, E. R.
, 155–156
Buchanan, J. M.
, 117, 120, 123, 152, 174n71
Cairnes, J.E.
, 25, 26, 27, 34, 46, 48, 49, 51, 63, 64, 65
Causality
, 11–12, 131
Causal law
, 12–14, 15, 18, 19, 20–21, 30–31, 33, 34, 43–44, 46, 53, 69, 71–72, 163, 165
Centralized economy
, 29, 103
Cheung, S. N. S.
, 147
Choice of institutional setting
, 5, 103
Choice of institutions
, 13, 35, 48, 102–104, 164
Choice of opportunity cost patterns
, 102
Christian European culture
, 137, 138
Clark, C. M. A.
, 58, 59
Classical economic theory
, 46, 48, 83
Classical economists
, 26, 27, 48, 50, 85
Coase, R. H.
, 147, 157
Coercion
, 35, 43, 105, 147, 148, 148, 159, 160, 161, 162, 172n39
Coercive transactions
, 43, 105, 159, 161, 162
Cohen, J. D.
, 72, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108
Commons, J. R.
, 105, 180n118
Competition among species
, 38
Competition within species
, 38
Complexity
, 20, 71, 72
Confucionist behavioral principles
, 68
Constitutive rules
, 118, 175n81
Control
, 6–7, 55, 57–59
Controlled experiment
, 29, 73, 77, 165
Cooperative behavior
, 10, 69
Coordination game
, 116
Corruption
, 63
Cultural bias
, 14, 31
Cultural evolution
, 82, 83, 177n95
Cultural opportunity costs
, 23, 103, 124, 139, 144
Cultural predetermination of economic performance
, 141
Cultural preference
, 95, 96, 100, 101, 103, 104, 109, 121, 139, 154
Cultural rule
, 139, 141
Cultural value
, 68, 88, 89, 90, 92, 95, 103, 131, 135, 139, 141, 143, 163
Culture
, 4, 5, 10, 13, 16, 17, 20, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 37, 38–39, 41, 42, 47, 50, 56, 57, 60, 63, 65, 66–67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 75, 76, 85, 90, 92, 95, 100, 101, 107, 111, 120–127, 129–144, 158, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 170n25, 174n67, 174n69, 177n92, 178n102
Culture blindness
, 16, 26, 27, 68, 121–123, 135, 136, 178n102
Culture formation
, 4, 42, 70, 135, 136, 139, 140–144
Definition of fitness
, 39–40
Definition of institutions
, 66, 101, 102, 111, 118, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 176n89
Definition of life
, 3, 33, 36, 44, 83, 144
Definition of rules
, 111–113, 137
Definition of wealth
, 49
Demsetz, H.
, 148, 152–154
de Tocqueville, A.
, 99, 143, 176n85
Diggs, B. J.
, 117, 118
Disorder
, 22, 23
Disturbing forces
, 5, 25–26
Economic axiom
, 11, 30, 46–52
Economic development
, 5, 38, 63, 92, 94, 114
Economic motive
, 85
Economic performance
, 14, 15, 28, 38, 41, 89, 95, 126, 129, 133, 139, 140–144, 145
Economic potential
, 39
Economic precepts
, 64
Economic regularities
, 4
Economic system
, 5, 28, 29, 37, 48, 132, 168
Eichner, A. S.
, 26, 58
Ellig, J.
, 147, 158
Emerged rules
, 16, 34, 35, 41, 42, 53, 137, 145, 164, 167
Emergence of rules
, 41–42, 113, 167
Emotional responses
, 104, 106, 107, 108
Ends
, 3, 4, 5, 10–11, 13, 15, 36, 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, 52, 53, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 71, 72, 77, 81–94, 101, 117, 123, 125, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139, 144, 164, 165–166, 171n34, 177n94
Enforcement
, 41, 62, 102, 114, 115, 116, 119, 130
Enforcer
, 41, 103, 113, 114
Entropic degradation
, 10, 13, 23, 34, 47, 53, 81, 87, 91, 98, 164, 174
Entropic movement
, 34
Entropy
, 23, 71, 75, 163, 164
Envy
, 5, 6, 37, 42, 70, 107
Ethical values
, 47
Eucken, W.
, 47, 174n68
Evolutionary sciences
, 62, 63, 74
Exact regularities
, 21, 23, 24, 164
Ex ante coercion
, 161, 162
Ex ante enforcement
, 114–115
Expansive corruption
, 104
Ex post coercion
, 160, 162
Ex post enforcement
, 114
Extended utility
, 4
External-component ends
, 84, 86, 88, 90
External consistency
, 18, 20, 21, 31, 33, 34, 46, 58, 163
Externalities
, 6, 147, 148–155, 162
Fake knowledge
, 59, 74
Falsifiability
, 31, 75–76, 77, 165, 170n24
Falsification
, 25, 75, 176n88
Footbridge Scenario
, 104–105
Formation of human ends
, 35, 137, 144, 164
Free markets
, 5, 45, 103, 124, 168, 175n77
Free trade
, 56, 168
Free-willed man
, 3, 70, 71
Friedman, M.
, 12, 72, 73, 74
Fudulu, P.
, 29, 68, 108, 132, 148, 172n42
Fukuyama, F.
, 20, 37, 39, 74, 166, 169n15, 174n68
General corruption
, 63, 102, 167
General Power
, 102, 167
General power perspective
, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 101, 104, 106, 107, 108
Genetic fitness
, 39, 40
Georgescu-Roegen, N.
, 45, 96
Goals
, 41, 69, 96, 117, 119, 126, 127, 175n74, 175n77
Goldin, K. D.
, 155, 156, 157, 158
Greek culture
, 137–138
Hale, R. L.
, 105, 180n118
Hayek, F. A.
, 5, 6, 34, 41, 42, 75, 105, 107, 108, 130, 134, 148, 180n118
Heilbroner, R. L.
, 20, 59
Herskovits, M. J.
, 4, 21, 24, 70, 92, 100, 132
High, J.
, 147, 158
High entropy
, 35, 53, 81
Hobbes, T.
, 3, 37, 87, 97, 115, 121, 122, 123, 124, 164, 165, 173n56, 176n88
Hofstede, G.
, 37, 68, 89, 95, 99, 109, 120, 121, 129, 130, 133, 136, 138, 141, 142, 169n16, 174n65, 175n79, 176n83, 176n84, 176n85, 177n96, 177n97, 178n101, 178n102, 178n103, 178n105
Human conduct
, 4, 35, 36, 61, 86, 91, 164
Human mind
, 9, 10, 15, 20, 28, 38, 68, 69, 138
Human passions
, 37, 84
Hutchison, T.W.
, 63, 169n8
Individual inclusive fitness
, 39
Induction
, 9, 13, 25, 30, 33, 75
Instinct
, 69, 71, 87, 99
Institutional choice
, 4, 40, 57, 100, 102, 103, 158, 167, 172n40
Institutional economics
, 5, 31, 92, 102, 121, 122
Institution of a church
, 15, 29, 119
Institutions
, 4, 13, 15, 29, 36, 37, 39, 41, 45, 48, 57, 59, 62, 63, 64, 66, 75, 82, 94, 95, 101, 102–104, 111–127, 130, 132, 134, 137, 144, 157, 164, 166, 167, 168, 172n46, 176n89, 177n90, 178n98, 178n102, 178n104
Instrumental rules
, 117
Intermediate ends
, 87
Internal consistency
, 18, 33, 35, 45, 46, 49, 56, 58, 59, 77, 111, 155
Intrinsic rationalism
, 133
Inverse relationship between opportunity costs and preferences
, 97–99
Jastrow, R.
, 99
Justice
, 5, 6, 13, 34, 42, 67, 107, 125
Just ratio
, 6, 13, 35, 107, 108
Kasper, W.
, 123, 124, 125, 177n90
Keynes, J. M.
, 47, 49, 51, 171n32
Knight, F.H.
, 4, 9, 10, 11, 24, 27, 30, 36, 46, 52, 55, 68, 69, 76, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 100, 101, 132, 133, 137, 145, 166, 171n35, 173n54, 173n59
Knowledge
, 4, 7, 9, 12–13, 14, 21, 22, 23, 41, 42, 44, 55, 56, 57–58, 59, 61, 73, 74, 75, 85, 87, 99, 108, 126, 139, 144
Kuhn, T.
, 9, 21, 25, 75, 172n45
Laws, ultimate and derivative
, 18
Leviathan
, 115, 175n75
Life-performing ends
, 90
Locke
, 20
Low entropy
, 19, 35, 36, 38, 40, 53, 81, 91, 96–97, 101, 108, 164, 166
Manipulative control
, 7, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 68, 74, 77, 121, 165, 167
Maseland, R.
, 66, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 177n92, 178n98, 178n100
Material wealth
, 69, 85
Maximandum of general power
, 3, 35, 44, 45
Maximandum of wealth
, 3, 46–51
Maximization
, 3, 6, 13, 15, 18, 34–43, 45, 52, 53, 61, 62, 71, 96, 97, 125, 164, 165, 173n61
Maximizing individual
, 39, 42, 102, 108
Maximizing rules
, 47, 168
Meade, J. E.
, 43, 147, 148, 149, 152
Mega-choice
, 45, 49
Mega-end
, 15, 16, 17, 19, 24, 26, 31, 35–37, 38–39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 62, 65, 67, 71, 72, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92, 93, 101, 107, 131, 132, 133, 137, 138, 139, 140, 145, 147, 155, 162, 164, 166, 167, 171n34, 173n55
Mercantilism
, 26, 27
Meta-maximizing individual calculus
, 108
Meta-preference
, 19
Meta-rule
, 19
Meta-value
, 19
Methodological principles
, 25, 51
Methodological rule
, 11, 55, 58
Mill, J.S.
, 9, 11, 12, 13, 18, 20, 21, 24, 30, 31, 33, 47, 65, 70, 75, 84, 173n50
Mises, L.
, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 52, 53, 55, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 76, 86, 87, 88, 136, 164, 166, 170n19, 170n23, 171n33, 173n48
Mishan, E. J.
, 148
Moral concerns
, 76–77
Mutual conversion of preferences and rules
, 4, 13, 66, 166
National wealth
, 49
Natural control
, 7
Natural economic science
, 6, 7, 22, 33, 34, 35, 36, 43, 47, 53, 55, 58, 61, 68, 74, 75, 77, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168
Natural regularities
, 25, 30, 46
Natural sciences
, 3, 7, 9, 11, 22, 29, 30, 43, 44, 46, 55–58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 76, 77, 94, 165, 170n24, 171n36
Negative entropy
, 5, 18, 20, 21, 29, 35, 62, 101, 106, 172n38
Negative externality
, 149, 150, 155
Nomenclature
, 49, 51
Non-instrumental rules
, 117
North, D.
, 41, 63, 64, 67, 113, 123, 124, 125, 126, 131, 137, 172n46, 178n104
Oates, W. E.
, 148, 155, 179n113
Observed
, 44, 73, 77, 85, 100, 165
Observer
, 16, 73, 77, 112, 118, 136, 165
Observer-dependent facts
, 118
Observer-independent facts
, 118
Opportunistic behavior
, 112
Opportunity costs
, 4, 23, 28, 29, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 62, 66, 86, 92, 97–99, 1, 102–103, 104, 108, 109, 111–127, 132, 138, 139, 141, 142–143, 166, 174n70, 175n83, 176n85
Order
, 14, 22, 23, 31, 37, 65, 115–116, 170n22
Organicistic
, 20, 31
Orthodox economics
, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 31, 41, 43, 53, 56, 62, 63, 68, 74, 75, 77, 81, 83, 89, 91, 92, 94, 108, 132, 135, 136, 147, 155, 159, 163, 166, 167, 169n1, 171n37
Orthodox economic theory
, 5, 7, 11–21, 22, 27, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 76, 92, 101, 102, 104, 111, 124, 136–137, 144, 147, 162
Orthodox economist
, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 17, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 53, 57, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 126, 131, 132, 134, 135, 139, 147, 148, 155, 161, 165, 167, 169n1
Orthodox perspective
, 4, 6, 17, 28, 34, 36, 40, 41, 45, 52, 66, 67, 84, 85, 87, 93, 126, 137, 140, 148, 167, 169n1
Ostrom, E.
, 117, 121, 125, 174n71
Ostrom, V.
, 113, 122, 123, 127, 175n73, 176n88, 176n89
Passion-driven ends
, 82, 83, 84
Passions
, 37, 42, 44, 66, 83, 84, 90, 91, 123, 173n56
Patterned behavior
, 41, 70, 112
Pigou, A. C.
, 147
Plato
, 44, 90
Popper, K.
, 9, 11, 12, 13, 18, 21, 22, 25, 28, 30, 31, 33, 56, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 165, 166, 170n18, 170n24, 173n52
Positive externality
, 6, 43, 150, 151, 155, 162
Power equality
, 16, 17, 39, 45, 68, 114, 115, 121, 122, 132, 152, 154, 169n1, 175n75
Praxeology
, 10, 25, 28
Prediction
, 7, 73, 74–75, 77, 107, 113, 116, 165, 166
Pre-evolutionary sciences
, 60
Preferences
, 4, 13, 19, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40–41, 53, 65, 72, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95–99, 100, 101, 102, 108, 109, 121, 122, 123, 130, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 154, 164, 166, 167, 169, 174n62, 174n69, 175n83, 176n85
Pro-cooperative ends
, 81, 82
Property rights
, 152–153, 154, 179–180n114, 180n117
Public goods
, 6, 34, 35, 43, 50, 53, 56, 147, 155–162, 167, 180n117
Public goods theory
, 6, 43, 50, 155, 157, 158, 162
Quasi-axiom
, 34–35, 39, 52, 53, 164
Rationality
, 15–16, 68, 72, 83, 88, 92–93, 101, 104, 106, 108, 132, 133
Rawls, J
, 5, 118
Regularities
, 4, 6, 11, 19, 21–25, 27–31, 33, 46, 73, 75–76, 87, 91, 92, 163–165, 170
Regulative rules
, 118
Relative power
, 5–6, 15–20, 27–28, 30, 31, 36–39, 41–43, 45, 47, 50, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 65, 68, 69, 76, 82–86, 92–93, 99, 100, 101, 103, 107, 109, 114–122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 132, 133, 141–143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151–155, 158, 162, 164, 166, 167
Relative wealth
, 17, 20, 27, 49, 50, 63, 116
Restrictive corruption
, 104
Rights
, 152–154, 180
Robbins, L.
, 36, 81, 85, 86, 87, 96, 136
Roman culture
, 138
Rules
, 4, 5, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19–20, 24, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40–42, 47, 51, 55, 62, 65–66, 68, 75–77, 88, 92, 101, 102, 106, 111, 113–121, 123–125, 127, 130, 133–137, 139, 144–145, 156, 164–168, 169–170n16, 174n70, 174n71
Samuels, W. J.
, 59, 157, 172n41
Satisfaction
, 3, 4, 37, 40, 41, 46, 52, 53, 87, 91, 96, 97, 98, 130, 166, 171, 174
Scarcity
, 3, 51, 52, 53, 85, 100, 157, 171, 172
Schoeck, H.
, 37
Schrodinger
, 13, 18, 22–23, 33, 35, 44, 70, 74, 83, 91, 131, 164, 170
Scitovski, T.
, 147
Searle, J. R.
, 113, 118, 121, 175n81
Self-interest
, 26, 27
Self-love
, 44, 84, 90, 173n58
Senior, N. W.
, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 58, 60
Social control
, 55
Social experiment
, 28–29
Social justice
, 6, 42
Social regularities
, 22, 24–25, 27–31, 46, 73, 76, 164
Social sector
, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 29, 31, 37, 51, 129, 134
Specific causal law
, 12–16, 18–19, 30–31, 33, 34, 36, 39, 40, 53, 72, 163
State
, 6, 43, 56, 88, 115, 116, 147, 159, 161, 167
State coercion
, 35, 43, 161
Statistical regularities
, 6, 21–25, 76, 164
Stoics
, 3, 83, 165
Streit, M.E.
, 123–125, 177n90
Stubblebine, Wm. C.
, 152
Sublimated ends
, 66, 83, 173n55
Switch Scenario
, 104–106
Systematic corruption
, 5, 28, 41, 103, 104, 109, 117
Taxonomic method
, 60–61
Taxonomy of human ends
, 13, 82
Transaction costs
, 67, 131, 153, 180n115
Trans-cultural theory of institutions
, 111
Trial and error
, 70
Trolley Dilemma
, 105, 106
True knowledge
Ultimate ends
, 71, 86, 87, 88
“Understanding” (as a method)
, 4, 11, 67–68, 77
Unidirectional movement of cultures
, 38, 39, 121, 162, 166, 178n99
Values
, 4, 13, 19–20, 24, 29, 47, 88–89, 130–131, 136–137, 167
Values as desired
, 130
Vandenberghe, F.V.
, 130, 136, 177
Veblen, T.
, 37, 50, 58–63, 66, 74, 83, 84, 87, 100, 131, 164, 169n15
Verification
, 25, 75, 76
Vernacular
, 51, 64
Voigt, S.
, 115, 123, 125, 176
Voluntary transactions
, 5, 105, 160, 162
Wealth sector
, 19, 21, 51
Weber
, 13–17, 20, 31, 33, 39, 55, 72, 76, 92, 132, 133, 141, 163
Zeno
, 44, 90, 173n58
- Prelims
- Part I Natural Economic Assumptions and Methods
- Chapter 1 Introductory Notes: Failures and Puzzles
- Chapter 2 Preliminary Issues in Identifying a Natural Economic Axiom
- Chapter 3 The Singular Axiom of Natural Economic Science
- Chapter 4 The Methods of the Natural Economic Science
- Part II Natural Solutions to Unsolvable Problems of Orthodox Economics
- Chapter 5 The Anti-entropic Formation of Human Ends
- Chapter 6 The Anti-entropic Formation of Preferences and Some of Its Implications
- Chapter 7 Rules and Institutions as Opportunity Cost Patterns
- Chapter 8 The Anti-entropic Theory of Culture Formation and its Fundamental Impact on Economic Performance
- Chapter 9 Externalities and Public Goods as a Cover-up for Coercive Actions
- Chapter 10 General Conclusions: Theoretical and Practical
- Endnotes
- References
- Index