

## Endnotes

1. See Schenk (2002); also White (2013) on transnational comparisons and Osterhammel (2004) on models of Europe's historical development.
2. For Taylor (2003: 26), an 'implicit grasp of social space...stands to social theory in the same relation that my ability to to get around a familiar environment stands to a (literal) map of the area.' There are parallels in animal biology in the distinction drawn by Jakob von Uexküll (1926) between the perceived sphere (*Merkwelt*) and the sphere of action (*Wirkwelt*) (see Mubi Brighenti, 2019: 203). As I and others have stressed, it is important to distinguish between the formal aspects of European integration and the practical dimensions of transnational mobility. Someone can book a weekend trip from the UK to Lithuania without much awareness of where it is on the map.
3. This was the label used in a controversy in West German sociology in the mid-twentieth century over whether class should be seen as a *Realphänomen* or as a conceptual *Ordnungsphänomen* (see Dahrendorf, 1959: 150).
4. Renan (1896), who famously asked this question, answered it in very much this way.
5. See *Regions in the European Union Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics – NUTS 2016/EU-2*. Luxemburg: Eurostat, 2018. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/9397402/KS-GQ-18-007-EN-N.pdf/68c4a909-30b0-4a90-8851-eddc400a5faf>.
6. London is a special case, since it has a mayor and an assembly.
7. See also Paquet (1920).
8. See the discussion of the Danube in Chapter 5, below.
9. For a useful recent discussion of regionalism, defined by Mario Telò (forthcoming) as 'relations among neighboring countries belonging to the same continent', in the context of multilateralism and current challenges to it, see de Marques, Meyer, and Telò (forthcoming).
10. For a still useful overview of the issues, see Anderson and Goodman (1995); also Faludi (2013b).
11. He points out that many states are very small (Van Langenhove, 2016); there are almost as many cities as states with five million inhabitants and nearly 50 cities with more than 10 million. <http://citypopulation.de/world/Agglomerations.html>.
12. See also Sykes and Shaw (2008).
13. See for instance Mann (2006).
14. See [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Archaic\\_globalization.svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Archaic_globalization.svg).
15. Buzan and Waever (2004) identified 22 'complexes' in North America, West Africa, the Andean North, the Balkans and so on.
16. Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain. Cyprus was also seriously affected by the crisis.

17. The anti-European tradition of Europe, Andrei Pleșu, *Eurozine*, 19 February 2018. Published 19 February 2018. Downloaded from eurozine.com (<https://www.eurozine.com/anti-european-tradition-europe/>). See also Müller (2018).
18. <https://www.espon.eu/>.
19. ESPON project 3.2. Spatial Scenarios and Orientations in relation to the ESDP and Cohesion Policy. Final Report October 2006. [https://www.espon.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/fr-3.2\\_final-report\\_vol1.pdf](https://www.espon.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/fr-3.2_final-report_vol1.pdf). The maps are on pages 31 and 34.
20. Counterfactual history is of course problematic, but it is worth considering whether a strategy which benefited eastern Germany (admittedly quite well resourced by the Federal government) might have helped to mitigate its continuing economic and political malaise.
21. The European Spatial Development Perspective, despite its innovative approach, did not obtain political support. Evers (2008: 305) wrote that it ‘may be ignored at will’.
22. On multi-level governance, see Olsson (2003), Marks and Hooghe (2004), Bache and Flinders (2004), and Piattoni (2018). There has been some controversy over whether it may tend to undermine democratic institutions; see Olsson (2003), Peters and Pierre (2004), and Stubbs (2005). I discuss this issue in the concluding chapter of this book.
23. For an overview, see Outhwaite (2019) and Rosamond (2019). On the spatial dynamics of Europeanisation, see Jones and Clark (2010); the authors critique the treatment of territory ‘as a passive backdrop over which Europeanization politics and political actions are played out – a setting, rather than a dynamic quantity in its own right’ (p. 151).
24. See, for example, Werner and Zimmermann (2002), who stress the reflexivity of these forms of history; Osterhammel (2001).
25. The term was first used by Fawcett and Hurrell (1995); see Telò (2015: 24).
26. Transregionalism is centrally concerned with the interactions between large global regions, but Middell’s introductory chapter brings out the flexibility of the approach. The imperial national states of western Europe, for example, were transregional in this sense, and the European Union has a vestigial presence in the surviving overseas territories of France.
27. The term ‘methodological nationalism’ is a good example of the reinvention of social scientific concepts. Introduced by the Portuguese-British sociologist Hermínio Martins (1974), it was relaunched in the present century by Ulrich Beck. See Wimmer and Schiller (2002).
28. See in particular the work of Mario Telò; for a useful introduction to the implications of new regionalism for European studies, see Warleigh-Lack (2015).
29. Katzenstein’s book, despite its broader focus, placed particular emphasis on Germany and Japan as ‘core regional states’ in their respective regions (Katzenstein, 2005: 1).
30. [osi.bg/downloads/File/2018/TryHarder\\_CatchUpIndex2017\\_ReportMay2018.pdf](https://osi.bg/downloads/File/2018/TryHarder_CatchUpIndex2017_ReportMay2018.pdf).
31. Osterhammel (2005: 473) distinguishes nine possible forms of such interactions.

32. See <https://www.seinamaritime.fr/actualites/signature-dun-nouveau-contrat-de-5-ans-pour-la-ligne-dieppenewhaven.html>.
33. My translation. It is tempting to comment that only such a cosmopolitan figure as Gottmann, who lived and worked in the US and Britain as well as France, could come up with the image of France as a mere isthmus.
34. See also Kahn (2014).
35. The quotation is taken from Simmel's 1908 version in his *Soziologie* (various editions and translations). Reprinted in Eigmüller and Vobruba (2016: 17).
36. See, for example, <https://www.soziologie.de/sektionen/europasozioogie/home/>.
37. A recent edited collection is one of many which deliberately brought together academics and practitioners (Foster & Grzymiski, 2019).
38. This is the approach classically advocated by Max Weber in the opening sentence of his posthumously published *Economy and Society: Sociology...is a science which aims at the interpretive understanding of action in order thereby to explain it.*' My first book, *Understanding Social Life* (Outhwaite, 1975) traced the roots of this approach and its subsequent development in what is sometimes called critical hermeneutics.
39. See also Koselleck (2000) and the work of Edward Soja, who invented the term 'spatial turn' (Döring & Thielmann, 2009 – also (p. 22 n. 73) for the reference to Ratzel). John Döring (1989: 9) had earlier criticised what he called 'the devaluation of place in social science'.
40. For a discussion of Foucault's conception of territory, see Elden (2013b).
41. Quoted by Soja (1989: 81). A decade earlier, Mandel (1963) had analysed 'the dialectic of class and region in Belgium'.
42. See, for example, the analysis by Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004).
43. [https://ec.europa.eu/romania/sites/romania/files/tratatul\\_de\\_la\\_roma.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/romania/sites/romania/files/tratatul_de_la_roma.pdf).
44. 'The Unity of the Drive for Europe', [aei.pitt.edu/14252/1/S80.pdf](http://aei.pitt.edu/14252/1/S80.pdf).
45. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:11986U/TXT>. It is worth noting the ambiguity of the reference to 'regions', which might apply to parts of member states or to broader transnational regions.
46. See Kelleher, Batterbury, and Stern (1999).
47. On the possible influence of Ibn Khaldun on Montesquieu, see Gates (1967). More distant influences may include Aristotle and Tacitus.
48. On border regions, see in particular the work of Philipp Ther (Ther, 2001, 2004; Ther & Sundhaussen, 2003; also the special issue of *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps* ('Espaces de voisinage'), 2010/1–2 (N° 97–98) and Stokłosa and Beiser (2014). On post-1990 border regions, see Meinhof (2002) and later works and, for an account of the difficulties confronting cross-border planning, Špaček (2018).
49. See, for example, Magnusson and Ottosson (2009); also Outhwaite (2016, ch. 3).
50. See also <http://www.laender-analysen.de/polen/pdf/PolenAnalysen171.pdf>.
51. <http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/natur/hirsche-stoppen-an-frueherer-grenze-zwischen-ost-und-west-a-945071.html>.

52. 'Es hat sich bewahrheitet, dass die Kohäsion zwischen den Zentren und Provinzen der alten Monarchie nach wie vor stark war und nicht bloß ein nostalgisch-kraftloses Relikt.'
53. See also Wittenberg (1997).
54. See Mishkova (2008) and Grandits et al. (2015). There are of course echoes in my analysis of what is called 'constructivism' in International Relations. See also Eder (2006) and Antonsich (2008a, 2008b). (The latter article addresses the self-definition of Europe in relation to its 'others'.)
55. An element in the explanation of this shift is the discrediting of geopolitics by Nazism. One of the less savoury theorists of the transnational *Grossraum* was of course the Nazi Carl Schmitt (see, for example, Chiantera-Stutte, 2008; Elden, 2010; Groth & Höhn, 2018). On the related issue of the division of the world into large-scale societies or 'civilisations', see Osterhammel (2005: 468–472).
56. See also the introduction to a special issue of the *Journal of Modern European History* by Dipper and Raphael (2011).
57. For a somewhat different but complementary approach, see, for example, Stokes (1997) and Delanty (2018).
58. Osterhammel (2005: 471) makes the point that before the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s few people in the rest of Europe were aware of the substantial Muslim population which had lived in Bosnia for centuries.
59. The relatively upbeat tone of the EU's Country Strategy Paper 2007–2013 (European Commission, n.d.) did not survive the annexation of Crimea; see European Union External Action Service, (2017) for a more recent assessment. On geopolitics, see Venier (2010) and Jessop and Sum (2018).
60. Schenk (2002: 499 n. 25) suggests that, whereas in the English-language literature 'Eastern Europe' usually excludes Russia, the German literature tends to include it. The German usage has the drawback that Russia stretches across Asia as far as the Pacific.
61. Mackinder secured the speedy translation of Partsch's book.
62. Except for Finnish (and Lappish), the languages are mutually intelligible. The term *Norden* includes Finland, whereas 'Scandinavia' does not.
63. See ESPON, Territorial Observation No 10, February 2014: 'Potentials and challenges for Iceland, Liechtensten, Norway and Switzerland – and for the European Union'. <https://www.espon.eu/topics-policy/publications/territorial-observations/potentials-and-challenges-iceland-liechtenstein>. Accessed on September 14, 2019.
64. Population figures are of course fluid for regions of this kind. Kęstutis Girnius (2011: 33) gives the Baltic region 50–80 million inhabitants, but a hinterland brings the total up to more like 230 million.
65. See <https://www.coe.int/en/web/history-teaching/five-key-dates-in-europe-s-recent-history>; also Höpken (2010: 295–296).
66. See also Horváth, in Hardy (1995), Dingsdale (1999a: 212, 214), Dingsdale (2001: 208–209), and Kocziszky, Nagy, Tóth, and David (2015).
67. See Ohana (2003).

68. A comparison with the Nordic countries would be interesting here, as part of a more differentiated approach to 'euroscepticism'.
69. A narrower version of Atlantic Europe focuses on the UK and Ireland (known in the former but not the latter as the 'British Isles') and their relationship with North America (Gamble, 2010).
70. See also the EU's interactive map and related material: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/RCI/#?vis=border.typology&lang=en>.
71. Lewis and Wigen (1997: ix) define metageography as referring to 'the spatial structures through which people order their knowledge of the world...'
72. See [www.cnfpt.fr/s-informer/bouquets-ressources/cadre-reglementaire-du-projet-territoire](http://www.cnfpt.fr/s-informer/bouquets-ressources/cadre-reglementaire-du-projet-territoire).
73. [https://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/FP/MORO/Forschungsfelder/2008/UeberregionalePartnerschaften/01\\_Start.html?nn=432768&notFirst=true&docId=432728](https://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/FP/MORO/Forschungsfelder/2008/UeberregionalePartnerschaften/01_Start.html?nn=432768&notFirst=true&docId=432728).
74. <http://cremaschi.dipsu.it/files/2009/10/SintestiSIUMiitt.pdf>.
75. For an overview, see Waterhout (2010).
76. See also Waterhout (2010).
77. The 'crowns' still used in Scandinavia and the Czech Republic are national currencies sharing a common name.
78. See also Geyer (1989) and Weigel (2002).
79. See [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n\\_9784](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9784). In an interview in 1965 De Gaulle vigorously rejected the idea that Europe might provide a solution to France's economic and structural problems. 'Alors il faut prendre les choses comme elles sont, car on ne fait pas de politique autrement que sur des réalités. Bien entendu, on peut sauter sur sa chaise comme un cabri, en disant: l'Europe! l'Europe! l'Europe!... mais ça n'aboutit à rien et ça ne signifie rien. Je répète: il faut prendre les choses comme elles sont.' [https://fr.wikiquote.org/wiki/Charles\\_de\\_Gaulle#Citations\\_rapport.C3.A9es](https://fr.wikiquote.org/wiki/Charles_de_Gaulle#Citations_rapport.C3.A9es).
80. See <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/astonish.html>. Accessed on October 17, 2019.
81. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/evenements/textes\\_victor\\_hugo.asp](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/evenements/textes_victor_hugo.asp).
82. Cited in Le Rider (2008: 160).
83. See <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k83331f/f113.image>; Swedberg (1994).
84. [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Centre\\_of\\_Europe.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Centre_of_Europe.jpg).
85. See for instance <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/10095393/KS-HA-19-001-EN-N.pdf/d434affa-99cd-4ebf-a3e3-6d4a5f10bb07>.
86. For a discussion of 'cartographic anxiety' focussed on China but also of more general interest, see Billé (2016).
87. <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/territorial-policies/resources/visualisations/3dmap-gdp-projection>.
88. <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/territorial-policies/t-board>. The core map, while the site was still under development, had an unexplained binary division of the EU territory as a whole between the South-West (including western Italy and part of Germany as well as the Atlantic regions) and the rest. (Non-member states in the Western Balkans were left blank, as though engulfed by the Mediterranean.) Another current map represents the euro area 'as a geographical and economic

- entity': <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/cdab4743-1489-11e9-81b4-01aa75ed71a1>.
89. See <http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/map/maps.html>. Accessed on October 17, 2019.
  90. Much of southern Sweden, for example, is best reached by air via Copenhagen.
  91. On the other side, the demand for accession was similarly motivated. Mattli (1999: 15) noted 'that eighteen out of twenty applications for EU membership by eleven West European states were submitted after one or –more typically – several years of economic growth rates that fell well below the Community average.' This was certainly part of the reasoning behind the UK's pursuit of accession in the 1960s.
  92. Still outside (as well as Cyprus) are Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria, which recently stalled its application on the grounds that it might receive more migrants. <https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/bulgaria-doesnt-want-to-join-schengen-zone-for-now-due-to-fear-of-migrant-invasion/>.
  93. See also Sjursen (2002), who gives more weight to normative considerations, where Schimmelfennig stresses the rhetorical 'trap' which restrained Mitterrand and others from pursuing their objections more vigorously.
  94. The European Parliament office in London chose for some time not to distribute some of the available material, for fear of antagonising the eurosceptics. (I owe this information to one of my former PhD students, Sobrina Edwards.)
  95. Williams (1996: 98) sketched out a counterfactual scenario in which the British overcame their myopia and ran high-speed links to Liverpool and/or Bristol and Southampton, reviving their fortunes and making Liverpool a key Atlantic port for Europe.
  96. Lemberg (1985: 59) suggests that the Middle Ages favoured an east-west division, shaped by religious differences. See also Johnson (2002: 24): 'As early as the twelfth century, the term *Europa occidentalis*, "Western Europe", was used to describe the region west of a line that ran roughly from the lower Danube valley along the eastern Carpathian Mountains and up to the Baltic...it corresponded to the spheres of influence of Western Christianity and eastern Orthodoxy or Rome and Byzantium.'
  97. This saw also, according to Lemberg (1985: 70), the first diplomatic use of the terms 'Europe intermédiaire' or 'Mitteleuropa'.
  98. In Britain, the opposite is the case, with the south becoming relatively even richer than the north and west. This is the typical division in 'nordic' regions, compensated by an image of the rugged north. In France, the south, remote from Paris and long neglected, has become more developed, though unevenly.
  99. For a particularly rich and nuanced discussion of the way this issue was approached by interwar German liberal intellectuals, see Harrington (2016).
  100. See also Hroch (2015) and Arnason (2010: 143). These Western continuities can be over-stated, especially if one takes account of the global imperial role of all these states, as Gurminder Bhambra (2017) has pointed out in relation to the British case and Timothy Snyder (2014) for Europe as a whole. Overall, however, the point stands.

101. For a thoughtful discussion of the parallels between the postcommunist and the postcolonial condition, see Ștefănescu (2013). See also Bottez et al. (2011).
102. See [https://www.gla.ac.uk/0t4/crcees/files/summerschool/readings/school110/reading\\_list/schultz.pdf](https://www.gla.ac.uk/0t4/crcees/files/summerschool/readings/school110/reading_list/schultz.pdf). Accessed on October 17, 2019.
103. A special issue of the *European Journal of Social Theory* is devoted to Central Europe (Strâth & Chiateră-Stutte, 2008).
104. See also Bernath (1985: 17–20) and Gergely (1985: 35).
105. Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies. Created in 1989, this programme was later extended to the rest of the bloc and complemented in 1991 by TACIS: Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States. The term PHARE, apart from its connotations of lightening the postcommunist darkness, may have been chosen to make the English label for the programme more acceptable to France.
106. I have followed the general trend in not differentiating between the two terms, though Vidmar-Horvat and Delanty (2008: 216) suggest that Central Europe is focussed on Berlin, while *Mittleuropa* is polycentric and, if anything, centred on Vienna. This idea of diversity was celebrated as its defining property by György Konrad (cited in Blokker, 2008: 262).
107. As Bruno Werlen (1993: 142) pointed out, rather than treating physical distance as a causally efficacious property, as when we say that the distance between Oxford and Glasgow makes for a long train journey, it is more meaningful ‘to talk of problems with the way material objects on the earth’s surface are arranged.’
108. See the 2013 strategy document: <https://www.government.nl/topics/spatial-planning-and-infrastructure/documents/publications/2013/07/24/summary-national-policy-strategy-for-infrastructure-and-spatial-planning>.
109. For an interesting Japanese summary covering the EU, nine western European countries and twelve in the Asia-Pacific region, see ‘An Overview of Spatial Policy in Asian and European Countries’ [https://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/international/spw/general/eu/index\\_e.html](https://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/international/spw/general/eu/index_e.html). On spatial concepts in Hannah Arendt’s political theory, see Debarbieux (2016).
110. The French Ministère de la Cohésion des Territoires includes a ‘cohesion barometer’. <http://www.cget.gouv.fr/dossiers/rapport-cohesion-territoires>. The 2017 presentation places French unemployment in context with the rest of Europe, differentiating the east and south from the rest. [http://www.cget.gouv.fr/sites/cget.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/barometre\\_cohesion\\_des\\_territoires-2017\\_12.pdf](http://www.cget.gouv.fr/sites/cget.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/barometre_cohesion_des_territoires-2017_12.pdf) (p. 12).
111. Ferguson and Gupta (2002: 989) write of ‘transnational governmentality’, focusing not so much on the EU, which they mention in passing (p. 996), as on global governance in postcolonial contexts.
112. The Spaak Report on which the Treaty was based was a good deal more ambitious (Faludi, 2007a: 30).
113. In the French version of the text (p. 29) the term is *planification territoriale*, which is also currently used on the website of the French Ministère de la Cohésion des Territoires. <http://www.cohesion-territoires.gouv.fr/planification-territoriale>. For an overview with case studies, see Schmitt and Van Well (2016).

114. A recent review concluded that around three quarters were currently active (Durà, Camonita, Berzi, & Noferini, 2018: 32).
115. On the origins of Baltic cooperation, see, for example, Hanne and Stampehl (2003).
116. This has since expanded its range to include South-West France, the whole of Spain and even Gibraltar: <https://www.portugal2020.pt/Portal2020/Media/Default/docs/17.%20SUODOEportalJulho2014.pdf>.
117. <https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/elevation-map-of-europe>.
118. For further information please see [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/sites\\_hab/biogeog\\_regions/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/sites_hab/biogeog_regions/index_en.htm).
119. [https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_386\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_386_en.pdf).
120. Willemyns (2010: 55) notes, however, that 'in Europe there are only two states which are de facto monolingual: Portugal and Iceland.'
121. For overviews of language use in Belgium, see Réguer (2004, chapter 6); also [www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/europe/belgiqueetat\\_demo.htm](http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/europe/belgiqueetat_demo.htm).
122. See articles by the linguist François Grosjean [https://www.francoisgrosjean.ch/bilin\\_suisse\\_fr.html](https://www.francoisgrosjean.ch/bilin_suisse_fr.html).
123. In some cases, notably Latvia, it remains the native language of former Russian migrants.
124. Activities on this basis are still continuing: <https://www.francebleu.fr/emissions/conta-monde/toulouse/un-rencontre-occitano-catalan-en-arieja>. Accessed on September 12, 2019.
125. Quoted by Stuart Holland (2017: 11).
126. Religious differences may again be relevant here. Nolte (1995, 2003) has suggested that part of the explanation of the lack of economic dynamism in the areas recaptured by Christian states from the Islamic world is the expulsion or massacre of their Muslim inhabitants; Orthodox states were generally more tolerant than Latin Christian ones.
127. TO9 (December 2013). Territorial Dynamics in Europe: Gateway Functions in Cities: <https://www.espon.eu/topics-policy/publications/territorial-observations/territorial-dynamics-europe-gateway-functions>, here p. 10. Accessed on September 14, 2019.
128. For an example of flood risk, see the results of a Polish-Swiss project: Kundzewicz, Stoffel, Niedzwiedz, and Wyżga (2016). See also the ESPON report TO7: Natural Hazards and Climate Change in European Regions, May 2013: <https://www.espon.eu/climate-2013>. Accessed on September 14, 2019.
129. This map excludes Switzerland and Norway, and does not yet include Croatia. See also the ESPON report: Territorial Dynamics in Europe: Regions Integrating Land and Sea (August 2013): <https://www.espon.eu/topics-policy/publications/territorial-observations/territorial-dynamics-europe-regions-integrating>. Accessed on September 14, 2019.
130. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pannonian\\_Basin#/media/File:Europe\\_biogeography\\_countries.svg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pannonian_Basin#/media/File:Europe_biogeography_countries.svg).
131. The North East of England actively pursued economic and other regional initiatives but suffered from being lumped together with Cumbria in the North-

- West and with Yorkshire and Humberside; it was not until 1997 that it was established as a distinct region (Menu, 2004: 193).
132. See Meyer et al. (1997: 154) for some discussion of this.
  133. Van Well and Schmitt stress that it was the OECD which pioneered the transnational application of the concept of territorial governance (Schmitt & Van Well, 2016, chapter 1).
  134. Including high-tech innovation: as Büttner (2012: 85) points out, ‘Silicon Valley’ has lent its name to a number of imitators. In the UK alone, there are ‘silicon glen’ between Edinburgh and Glasgow, ‘silicon fen’ in Cambridge and ‘silicon roundabout’ in London’s Old Street.
  135. Habermas (1998) captured this idea in his conception of the ‘postnational constellation’.
  136. The eligible recipients include the 2004, 2007 and 2013 accession states as well as Greece and Portugal. 3). Bialasiewicz, Elden, and Painter (2005: 356) noted that the German text of the draft constitution referred to *Zusammenhalt*; the more technical term *Kohäsion* is used for the fund. See [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003XX0718\(01\)&from=DE](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52003XX0718(01)&from=DE).
  137. [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag65/mag65\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag65/mag65_en.pdf). See also the comprehensive listing of all 12 current transnational regions, including the four for which ‘specific EU agreed strategies exist’: <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/countries-regions/transnational-regions>.
  138. See also *Panorama 30: Cohesion Policy: 30 years investing in the future of European Regions*. [https://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag64/mag64\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag64/mag64_en.pdf).
  139. Cited by Büttner (2012: 91).
  140. CEC (2008), cited by Büttner (2012: 92). On the mixed success of cohesion policies in European regions, see Bachtler, Begg, Charles, and Polverari (2016).
  141. Jean Gottmann (1952: 61), who had had to flee Europe for the US, wrote that ‘De 1940 à 1944, on servait de la Geopolitik à toutes les sauces.’ On Dugin, see Umland (2007) and later articles.
  142. See also the special issue of *European Urban and Regional Studies* (2019).
  143. These three programmes were reviewed at a conference in Trieste in 2016: ‘At the crossroads of three European Macro-Regions: Danube, Adriatic-Ionian and Alpine Regions’: [http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC105020/jrc105020\\_macro-regional%20innovation%20week\\_conference%20report.pdf](http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC105020/jrc105020_macro-regional%20innovation%20week_conference%20report.pdf). See also European Commission, DG Regional and Urban Policy (2017) *Study on Macro-Regional Strategies and their Links with Cohesion Policy*. [https://www.alpine-region.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/publication/898/publications/macro-regional\\_strategies\\_and\\_their\\_links\\_with\\_cohesion\\_policy.pdf](https://www.alpine-region.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/publication/898/publications/macro-regional_strategies_and_their_links_with_cohesion_policy.pdf). EUSALP (2017) Making the most of macro-regions. [https://www.alpine-region.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/publication/851/publications/making\\_the\\_most\\_of\\_macro\\_regions\\_ebook.pdf](https://www.alpine-region.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/publication/851/publications/making_the_most_of_macro_regions_ebook.pdf).
  144. <https://interreg.eu/programme/interreg-north-sea-region/>.
  145. The upper Rhine has been the subject of long-standing cooperation agreements, beginning in 1971, and more recently three overlapping Interreg programmes,

- labelled RegioTriRhena (<https://www.regiotrirhena.org/>) and *Centre* (now rolled into one upper Rhine region (<http://www.interreg-rhin-sup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Carte-Rhin-Sup-2007-.jpg>)) and (for reasons which remain obscure) PAMINA ([https://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2000-2006/european/interreg-iii-a-pamina](https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2000-2006/european/interreg-iii-a-pamina)). For the origins of these programmes see Maury (2004).
146. As Simone Scagliarini (2018: 2) has noted of the Alpine macroregion, its six states include three different political models: 'federal states (Germany, Austria, Switzerland), unitary states (Slovenia, France) and regional state (Italy). See also Abels (2017; Abels and Battke 2019). On federalism, see, for instance, Behnke (2018).
  147. On scale, see Moore (2008). Elden (2013b: 13) refers to Foucault's discussion of the way in which, from the seventeenth century onwards, representations of the city 'served as models for the governmental rationality that was to apply to the whole of the territory.'
  148. The Danube Strategy, however, covers an area with 91 Cohesion Policy programmes (McMaster & van der Zwet, 2016).
  149. Johannes Hahn, cited in Gänzle (2017c: 407). For a 10-year retrospective, see [https://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/attachments/article/591073/EUSBSR%20Anniversary%20Publication\\_Better%20Together.pdf](https://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/attachments/article/591073/EUSBSR%20Anniversary%20Publication_Better%20Together.pdf).
  150. The Oslo-Berlin link could be prolonged to Trieste ([www.north-south-initiative.eu](http://www.north-south-initiative.eu)).
  151. [http://static.eu2013.lt/uploads/documents/Presidency\\_programme\\_EN.pdf](http://static.eu2013.lt/uploads/documents/Presidency_programme_EN.pdf).
  152. [https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/baltic-adriatic\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/baltic-adriatic_en).
  153. See [http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/site/maps\\_upload/SchematicA0\\_EUcorridor\\_map.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/site/maps_upload/SchematicA0_EUcorridor_map.pdf).
  154. See <http://www.baltic-sea-strategy-tourism.eu/>; also an undated document produced by the Confederation of Danish Industry: [di.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/Shop/Tourism%20in%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20Region\\_Web.pdf?productid=10345&downloadType=Produkt](http://di.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/Shop/Tourism%20in%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20Region_Web.pdf?productid=10345&downloadType=Produkt).
  155. <http://www.helcom.fi/Logos/HELCOM%20logos/All%20file%20formats/HELCOM%20logo%202013%20.jpg.jpg>.
  156. See in particular Heininen (2017).
  157. This remains a problem (Richard, Alexander, & Zotovaet, 2015; Zohn, 2019), with the initiatives and agreements around the turn of the century now largely abandoned. About the size of Northern Ireland, the most obvious future for the Kaliningrad oblast might seem to be something like that of Hong Kong, Macau and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone – an image endorsed in Moscow in 2006. The further development of the SEZ is, however, not viewed positively either by Russia or the EU. There are Polish and EU plans to construct a canal near Krynica Morska on the Vistula lagoon on the western border of the exclave, despite the ecological damage this would cause, because of difficulties of access to the sea through Russian territory. The Neman Euroregion was established in 1980, with the Kaliningrad oblast joining in 2002, but seems to do little beyond organising occasional conferences.

158. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conference-ministers-spatial-planning>.
159. See <http://www.cbss.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/strategy.pdf>; quoted passage on p. 11. See also Makarychev and Sergunin (2017). For background on the Northwestern Federal District, one of eight in the country, in relation to macro-regional planning, see Prozorov (2004). <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/d3f97709-5316-4433-97f1-eb54ea7bfaf9.pdf>.
160. <http://www.leontief-centre.ru/>.
161. <https://www.oresundsbron.com/en/node/6738>. See also Hospers (2006) and van der Vleuten and Kaijser (2005).
162. The Commission's archives are located at Galati, Romania. <http://www.danube.commission.org/dc/en/publishing-activities/library-of-the-danube-commission/>.
163. The Carpathian Convention's initial input is documented in [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/archive/consultation/danube/doc/contrib/eur\\_unep.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/consultation/danube/doc/contrib/eur_unep.pdf).
164. <http://www.danubeparks.org/?story=213>. The most recent project is a bridge low down the river, estimated to be completed in 2023: [https://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/en/newsroom/news/2019/09/09-02-2019-roumanie-des-deplacements-plus-rapides-a-travers-le-danube-et-vers-les-pays-voisins](https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2019/09/09-02-2019-roumanie-des-deplacements-plus-rapides-a-travers-le-danube-et-vers-les-pays-voisins).
165. See the project evaluation: [https://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/expost2006/expo\\_interreg\\_austria\\_slovakia\\_case.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/expost2006/expo_interreg_austria_slovakia_case.pdf).
166. <https://www.danube-region.eu/communication/news/616625-first-eusdr-strategic-projects-selected-and-validated-by-the-national-coordinators>.
167. The recent document on 'success stories' might seem to protest too much: [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/cooperate/danube/documents/eusdr\\_success\\_stories\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/cooperate/danube/documents/eusdr_success_stories_en.pdf). See also Vonhoff (2017).
168. [https://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala\\_stampa/archivionotizie/retediplomatica/2019/02/interscambio-record-tra-italia-e-serbia.html](https://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/retediplomatica/2019/02/interscambio-record-tra-italia-e-serbia.html).
169. See, for example, the intervention by CIPRA and other civil society organisations at the end of 2013: [http://www.cipra.org/en/media-releases/ngos-and-networks-for-a-macro-region-alps?set\\_language=en](http://www.cipra.org/en/media-releases/ngos-and-networks-for-a-macro-region-alps?set_language=en).
170. <https://northseablog.eu/constructing-the-future-transnational-cooperation-showcased-at-euregionsweek/>.
171. <https://northseablog.eu/interreg-high-level-conference-to-inspire-maritime-spatial-planning-in-two-seas/>.
172. <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/regulation-european-territorial-cooperation-2021-2027>.
173. <https://northseablog.eu/what-does-the-future-hold-highlights-from-the-north-sea-conference/>.
174. See, for example, the ESPON report which locates Norway in a European context, noting that it would be the country most severely affected (along with parts of Denmark, Ireland and Scotland) if European integration were to be halted or reversed: Territorial patterns and relations in Norway – Country fiche <https://www.espon.eu/norway>. Accessed on September 14, 2019. Also the earlier report TO10 – Potentials and Challenges for Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland – and for the European Union (March 2014): <https://www.espon.eu/topics-policy/publications/territorial-observations/potentials-and-challenges-iceland-liechtenstein>.

175. <http://cpmr.org/wpdm-package/macro-regional-and-sea-basin-strategies-preparing-the-future-of-european-integration/?wpdmdl=10994&ind=mEfIvpRzc73-tXxgCyyFGUd8cX3WsnjbCovZCHbMQsT7MS6rPa4PLkx2QMcuP6LOAbXi57KCC5GYo2GsIZ4vOg>.
176. [http://cpmr.org/wpdm-package/progress-report-on-the-governance-of-macro-regional-and-sea-basin-strategies/?wpdmdl=12468&ind=Um5Rp8mgBPX0R40cmjiZuFC6TJv6037l8paqMAOz7HEIgm6joevDuHZWfE9QWmldwSfATB83\\_YZVCoexDxA\\_2Q](http://cpmr.org/wpdm-package/progress-report-on-the-governance-of-macro-regional-and-sea-basin-strategies/?wpdmdl=12468&ind=Um5Rp8mgBPX0R40cmjiZuFC6TJv6037l8paqMAOz7HEIgm6joevDuHZWfE9QWmldwSfATB83_YZVCoexDxA_2Q).
177. Communication of the European Commission COM (2014) 284 final [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/cooperate/macro\\_region\\_strategy/pdf/gov\\_macro\\_strat\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperate/macro_region_strategy/pdf/gov_macro_strat_en.pdf).
178. <http://blacksea-cbc.net/black-sea-basin-2014-2020/jop/>. On the background to the region, see also Troebst (2006b).
179. <http://blacksea-cbc.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Eligible-areas.jpg>. The main input seems to be from Romania, which is presumably why some of the country names here are in Romanian. This is at least an 3 advance from the EU's position at the beginning of the century that 'Given their location, the Southern Caucasus...falls outside the geographical scope of this initiative for the time being' (quoted in Delcour & Hoffmann, 2018: 9). For current EU initiatives in the region, see Böttger and Plottka (2018).
180. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing\\_note/join/2013/491519/EXPO-AFET\\_SP\(2013\)491519\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491519/EXPO-AFET_SP(2013)491519_EN.pdf).
181. This was not entirely one-sided: the states of the Ottoman Empire also enslaved Christian Europeans, notably in the mid-sixteenth century. Daniel Hershenzon suggests that the numbers involved may have been around a million in each direction between 1530 and 1780. See Hershenzon (2018: 10): 'Ironically, the redemption of captives, ... geared toward separating Christians from Muslims, extended the social and religious boundaries of coastal communities and port cities in Spain and North Africa and created new links between them.'
182. Reviewing the developments since the special number in which Tasche's article was included, Dagmar Röttsches (2014: 5) introduced a further special number on this topic with the reflection that now 'a majority of the authors questioned the credibility of Europe's engagement.'
183. See also Hamel (2010).
184. Rossi report, cited by Bialasiewicz, Giaccaria, Jones, and Minca (2012: 67).
185. Palestine is recognized by exactly a third of EU member states (not counting the UK).
186. [http://www.ins-med.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Medgov\\_Mediterranean\\_Report4.pdf](http://www.ins-med.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Medgov_Mediterranean_Report4.pdf).
187. As Tasche (2010: 66) notes, 'France is not as dependent on Russian gas as other EU members because it already imports major flows from Norway and Algeria.'
188. BULLETIN DER BUNDESREGIERUNG Nr. 139-3 vom 5. Dezember 2007 – Journalisten-Symposium des „Konvents für Deutschland“, pp. 14–15. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975954/766060/d312e53e8bc1aa31db64c45cacbb5dff/139-3-bkin-data.pdf?download=1>. 'Wenn wir jetzt aber zum Beispiel eine Mittelmeerunion aufbauen, an der nur die Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten

teilnehmen, die sich aber zum Beispiel finanzieller Instrumente der Europäischen Union bedienen, dann sage ich voraus, dass dann andere sagen werden: Dann müssen wir auch eine Osteuropa-Union beispielsweise mit der Ukraine ins Leben rufen. Diese wird sich dann auch dieser Mittel bedienen. Dann wird etwas passieren, was ich für sehr gefährlich halte. Dann könnte es nämlich sein, dass sich Deutschland mehr von der mittel- und osteuropäischen Seite und Frankreich sich mehr von der Mittelmeer-Seite tangiert fühlt. Das würde Spannungen innerhalb Europas wachrufen, die ich nicht möchte. Deshalb muss klar sein: Die Mittelmeerverantwortlichkeit ist auch für einen Nordeuropäer vorhanden, genauso wie die Zukunft der Grenzen zu Russland und zur Ukraine auch Sache derer ist, die am Mittelmeer beheimatet sind. Wenn wir diese Kraft nicht mehr aufbringen, dann verfällt aus meiner Sicht die Europäischen Union in ihrem Kernbereich. Die Bildung einer Mittelmeerunion wäre nur ein sehr kurzfristiger Fortschritt, der sich meiner Meinung nach langfristig nicht bewähren würde.' (my translation).

189. [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news\\_corner/news/western-mediterranean-actions-sustainable-development-blue-economy\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news_corner/news/western-mediterranean-actions-sustainable-development-blue-economy_en).
190. Stefanie Dühr (2014a) produced a very full and negative report on the idea of a Central European macro-region. As for public awareness of the existing programmes, *Eurobarometer* has consistently recorded that around a fifth of European residents have heard of them; the Baltic strategy was somewhat better known than the others, with nearly a third describing themselves as aware of it (See Flash Eurobarometer 452).
191. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-18-3866\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-3866_en.htm).
192. Until 2020 the EU was in limbo between two leadership and funding periods.
193. See, for example, Wassenberg (2010).
194. <http://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/home>. For the background to this concept, see also Asheim, Isaksen, and Trippel (2019).
195. [https://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/information/pdf/brochures/rfec/2011\\_smart\\_growth\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/information/pdf/brochures/rfec/2011_smart_growth_en.pdf).
196. Benjamin, W. *Selected Writings*, trans. Rodney Livingstone, Volume 2, 1927–1934 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 37). When I produced a course handbook on 'The Idea of Europe' I made a point of using a map of this kind on the cover.
197. See also Hann (2016).
198. See Newby (1978: 88, 96).
199. In a wonderful illustration of this mutation, Caroline Humphrey (1983) described fishermen on Lake Baikal praying for a good catch to the spirits of two heroes of the Paris Commune.
200. Western discussions of '1989' have paid too little attention to Russia and China (see Tucker, 2012).
201. At present, however, this is a very small part of Chinese exports to the EU (*Vestnik Kavkaza* 2.12.15) <http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/China-creates-new-communications-Silk-Wind-project-to-be-non-political.html>. Around 90% remains via sea, with air accounting for more of the remainder than rail,

- despite Chinese subsidies which have led to empty wagons being sent to Europe (Behrendt, 2019: 4).
202. This has interesting parallels with Hroch (2015) and his model of nation-formation. On the similarities with Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of the chronotope, see Tihanov (2000: 57–61). Savitsky's works are now foregrounded on the Eurasianist Archive ([www.eurasianist-archive.com](http://www.eurasianist-archive.com)).
  203. Quoted by Podberezhkin and Podberezhkina (2015). Hannah Arendt (1963) also stressed the political effects of the similar terrain of the North American plains (See Debarbieux, 2016: 354). Elsewhere Arendt (1965: 263) wrote that the concept of territory 'relates not so much...to a piece of land as to the space between individuals in a group whose members are bound to, and at the same time separated and protected from each other by all kinds of relationships...'.
  204. Gumilëv stated in his last interview 'that if Russia is to be saved, it will be saved only as a Eurasian power and only through Eurasianism' (quoted by Glazhev, 2015).
  205. In Kazakhstan, Eurasianism also serves the idea of the national unity of 'Kazakhstanis', whether Kazakhs (who make up two-thirds of the population), Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks or whatever (Bassin, 2016: 276).
  206. As in Canada (Shields, 1991), there is something of a cult of the Arctic North.
  207. See also Katzenstein and Weygandt (2017: 428) and Kumar (2018).
  208. Including, for instance, at least lip service to the EU's 'four freedoms' (See Richardson, 2015 at n.34). The 2016 'Foreign Policy Concept' document referred to 'universal principles of integration' (Kaczmarek, 2017: 1369 at n.57) ASEAN also adopted EU models (Jetschke & Lenz, 2013).
  209. It has rejected weighted majority voting in favour of unanimity (Kaczmarek, 2017: 1372).
  210. Allison (2018: 336) suggests that China may be losing interest in the SCO and bypassing it in the OBOR/New Silk Road initiative, rather as Russia earlier saw the EEU as a more viable route than attempts to strengthen the coordination of the CIS. China is also developing an ambitious programme of bilateral links with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and most of postcommunist Europe, along the lines of its neocolonial activities in Africa. See Hala (2018).
  211. Quoted by the Russian business paper *Kommersant*; see Pourchot and Stivachtis (2014: 74).
  212. De Gaulle, however, also supported Québécois separatism in a notorious speech in 1967.
  213. The parallels between Russian and UK critiques of the EU are striking.
  214. See also Dragneva and Wolczuk (2017b).
  215. The first truck arrived in China from Germany in February 2019 after a journey taking 12 days; China had already delivered to Poland in the same time-frame.
  216. See also [https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/central-asia/54425/new-opportunities-take-eu-central-asia-partnership-forward\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/central-asia/54425/new-opportunities-take-eu-central-asia-partnership-forward_en).
  217. [https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-698599\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2018-698599_en).
  218. See the special issue of *The Geographical Journal* (Vol. 165, No. 2, 1999), 'The Changing Meaning of Place in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe: Commodification, Perception and Environment'.

219. Annual rates of movement from one US state to another are around 2%, as against around 0.1% in the EU, yielding a total of around 2% of the EU's population. [http://legacy.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report\\_pdfs/report\\_pdfs/iza\\_report\\_19.pdf](http://legacy.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report_pdfs/report_pdfs/iza_report_19.pdf). See also Batsaikhan, Darvas, and Raposo (2018). In 1960, for example, half of California residents were born inside the state, whereas by 2014 the proportion was a mere 18% (*New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/upshot/where-people-in-each-state-were-born.html?rref=upshot>). This source differentiates the US for presentational purposes into four regions: west, south, north and north-east.
220. An excellent site by Vienna-based biochemist Peter Kerpedjiev maps travel times by rail or equivalent from a wide range of cities. It is interesting to compare the maps for well-connected cities such as Brussels with that for, say, Vilnius, from where only Minsk is accessible by rail in what one might consider a reasonable time. <http://emptypipes.org/2015/05/20/europe-isochrone-map/>. For air connectivity see <https://public.tableau.com/profile/connectivity#!/vizhome/EUConnect-TEST/IntraEUAverage>.
221. <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/ruhestand-deutsche-rentner-zieht-es-ins-ausland-1.2008473>.
222. <https://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article167902553/Wir-mussten-fortgehen-um-keinem-zur-Last-zu-fallen.html>.
223. Some countries are linked to other networks: Nordic Estonia to the other Baltics, Turkey to Albania and Azerbaijan, Albania also to Macedonia (Charron, 2013: 490).
224. For a description of the project, see <https://rm.coe.int/native/16808add7a>. Those for the Danube, Baltic and Adriatic-Ionian regions can be accessed on <https://pjp-eu.coe.int/en/web/cultural-routes-and-regional-development/publications>.
225. [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Tourism\\_statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Tourism_statistics).
226. See 'Rural areas and the primary sector in the EU' (2018): <https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/statistics/facts-figures/eu-rural-areas-primary-sector.pdf>.
227. This is still the case; see a press release of May 2019: <https://www.hotrec.eu/wp-content/customer-area/storage/f16c45a1df4b7d3ea7490cf901e2898d/Tourism-requires-a-European-Commissioner-say-the-leaders-of-the-European-hospitality-sector-Press-Release.pdf>.
228. For a superb discussion of the concept of backwardness, see Hann (2015).
229. <https://www.crazyguides.com/>. The Trabant was in fact less common in Poland, which also had locally made Fiats, than in its native Germany. On Nowa Huta ('New Mill'), see Banaszekiewicz (2017) and Banaszekiewicz et al. 2017.
230. See also Chris Hann's study, discussed below, of the way in which EU inter-regional programmes also exacerbated tensions on the Polish-Ukrainian border (Hann, 1998).
231. See, for example, the special issue of *Holocaust Studies* 25, 3, 2019.
232. See European Travel Commission (2019: 10).
233. <http://www.karpacki.pl/marka-carpathia/marka-carpathia/>.

234. <http://www.forum-ekonomiczne.pl/debata-euroregiony-sposob-na-ozywienie-wspolpracy-spolecznej-i-gospodarczej-w-ramach-x-forum-europa-ukraina/>. Translated with [www.DeepL.com/Translator](http://www.DeepL.com/Translator), which I am happy to recommend.
235. See the report in the *International Railway Journal* (2016): [https://www.railjournal.com/in\\_depth/eu-funds-help-to-unlock-rails-potential-in-eastern-europe](https://www.railjournal.com/in_depth/eu-funds-help-to-unlock-rails-potential-in-eastern-europe).
236. [https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/ten-t-policy/linking\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/ten-t-policy/linking_en).
237. European Council of Ministers Responsible for Regional Planning, 'Guiding Principles for Sustainable Spatial Development of the European Continent' (2007); p. 6. <https://rm.coe.int/1680700173>.
238. On the impact of cohesion policy initiatives in the 2007–2015 period, see <https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc114044.pdf>. See also the 2018 seventh report: [https://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion7/7cr.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion7/7cr.pdf). The map of eligible recipients of structural funds in the 2014–2020 period includes as 'less developed regions' all the post-communist EU regions (except those surrounding Warsaw, Budapest and Bucharest), southern Italy, much of Greece, part of Spain and almost the whole of Portugal, as well as Cornwall and most of Wales.
239. For the UK, see Clifford and Tewdwr-Jones (2013).
240. LEADER, running since 1991, has been rolled into a broader framework of Community-Led Local Development (CLLD). See Ray (1999, 2000, 2001) and [https://enrd.ec.europa.eu/leader-clld\\_en](https://enrd.ec.europa.eu/leader-clld_en).