Blockholders can behave opportunistically because small shareholder voting suffers from coordination problems. In this chapter, we investigate the features of small shareholder voting using a theoretical framework. Specifically, we investigate when defeating a blockholder’s resolution is optional for shareholders. Regulatory initiatives that facilitate communication between small shareholders or focus on institutional investors and corporate governance tools that alter or add the threshold in the voting game also contribute to solving the coordination problem. These corporate governance initiatives can increase the relevance of AGMs in Europe.
Lafarre, A. (2017), "Small Shareholder Voting Coordination in Concentrated Ownership Structures", The AGM in Europe, Emerald Publishing Limited, pp. 269-288. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78743-533-920171014Download as .RIS
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