Unsolicited Proposals in Infrastructure – Lessons from Brazil and Chile

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the procurement of public–private partnerships (PPPs) through unsolicited proposals (USPs). This chapter compares the policy framework and economic data of USPs in Brazil and Chile and provides some economic insights based on this analysis. In line with the existing literature, empirical evidence shows that non-proponents rarely win the tender for a project based on a USP. Differently from the existing literature, data analysis suggests that USPs may result on successful projects only in very specific conditions. USPs may work better in sectors where the government has developed higher in-house expertise to manage infrastructure projects. Also, USPs are more fit to projects that are clearly economically viable ex ante. However, even in these cases, USPs might generate a higher transaction cost to the government and less competitive tenders in comparison to solicited proposals. The analysis focuses on countries that have a very rich experience in USPs. Nonetheless, given the different legal and regulatory environments around the globe, it is difficult to provide a one-size fits-all USP policy. This chapter aims to provide some insights into how to manage a USP in order to improve the public policy framework of this procurement tool. This chapter contributes to the literature as it provides an economic analysis of the conditions in which the USP mechanism could result in a successful project.

Citation

Camacho, F.T., Rodrigues, B.C.L. and Vieira, H.M.M. (2017), "Unsolicited Proposals in Infrastructure – Lessons from Brazil and Chile", Leitão, J., de Morais Sarmento, E. and Aleluia, J. (Ed.) The Emerald Handbook of Public–Private Partnerships in Developing and Emerging Economies, Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 559-578. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-1-78714-493-420171021