Sovereign default restructuring options and challenges in the European Monetary Union (EMU)

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and evaluate the sovereign default restructuring options in the European Monetary Union (EMU).

Design/methodology/approach

The paper examines financial policy options from a politico‐economic‐legal perspective. It relies primarily on secondary data analysis.

Findings

Sovereign default restructuring an unthinkable phenomenon in the hitherto affluent EMU could now be a possibility because of the lack of political cohesion and the realities of two‐speed European Union.

Research limitations/implications

The paper relies extensively on secondary data. Future research through empirical multiple case studies would enrich the insights of this paper.

Practical implications

Insights from the paper would be of benefit to lawmakers, financial supervisors, financial institutions and investors in general.

Originality/value

The paper's main value lies in its use of multiple lenses to evaluate a serious financial issue in the EMU.

Citation

Yeoh, P. (2011), "Sovereign default restructuring options and challenges in the European Monetary Union (EMU)", International Journal of Law and Management, Vol. 53 No. 3, pp. 182-198. https://doi.org/10.1108/17542431111133418