Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance: The Moderating Role of Firm Strategy as a Proxy of Managerial Discretion

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of strategic context on managerial compensation design, and the interactive influence on firm performance for a set of Spanish companies. Specifically, this study examines the performance implications of the fit between different managerial compensation systems and diverse firm’s strategic orientations – representing various levels of managerial discretion. Based on a framework combining agency theory and managerial discretion concept, a research design with both archival and survey data is used to test hypotheses in a sample of 82 firms. The findings offer sufficient confirmation of theoretical arguments, providing extensions of this research stream for non‐U.S. firms. Results show that firms benefit from the design of managerial compensation systems when they match the managerial control and risk‐bearing requirements imposed by the strategic context. Specifically, risk‐encouraging compensation systems are better for prospector firms – high level of managerial discretion – whereas risk‐discouraging compensation systems are better for defender firms – low level of managerial discretion.

Citation

Sánchez Marín, G. and Aragón Sánchez, A. (2005), "Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance: The Moderating Role of Firm Strategy as a Proxy of Managerial Discretion", Management Research, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 137-148. https://doi.org/10.1108/15365430580001318