The independence of financial analysts: evaluation of an alternative proposal

Abstract

Recent evidence suggests that financial analysts have substantial conflicts of interest when publishing their research reports. We argue that not only investors but also listed companies benefit from analyst coverage and suggest that the financial burden of such coverage be shifted entirely to those companies. This article presents a detailed evaluation of a not‐widely‐known proposal that stock exchanges ensure analyst coverage for the companies they list through a levy on their listing fees. We discuss key aspects of the regulatory framework required to ensure the independence of these financial analysts as well as some of its shortcomings. We conclude that this proposal has the potential to ensure the independence of financial analysts more efficiently than the current regulatory approach does.

Citation

Krause, A. (2003), "The independence of financial analysts: evaluation of an alternative proposal", Journal of Investment Compliance, Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 52-57. https://doi.org/10.1108/15285810310813202