To be or not: feeding information in standard minority games

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to analyse a standard grand canonical minority game (MG).

Design/methodology/approach

Agents are divided into two groups: speculators, who trade adaptively, and producers who trade deterministically. Information acts on the amount of the two types in the system, modifying the share.

Findings

When the system is out of equilibrium, stylized facts arise, such as fat tailed distribution of returns and volatility clustering. If speculators abandon price taking behavior, stylized facts disappear.

Originality/value

The modified MG presented here is able to reproduce qualitatively a whole range of stylized facts. Most importantly, its quite rich behavior can be studied analytically.

Citation

Corelli, A. (2012), "To be or not: feeding information in standard minority games", Journal of Risk Finance, Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 171-178. https://doi.org/10.1108/15265941211203215