The Hawk and the Dove, Paul Nitze, George Kennan and the History of the Cold War

Citation

Thompson, N. (2011), "The Hawk and the Dove, Paul Nitze, George Kennan and the History of the Cold War", Foresight, Vol. 13 No. 1, pp. 77-78. https://doi.org/10.1108/14636681111109714

This is the remarkable tale of the two American strategists most responsible for anticipating the detailed future of US‐Soviet relations from the late 1940s until virtually the end of the twentieth century. Neither military‐industrialists nor technologists, they were Paul H. Nitze (born 1907) and George F. Kennan (born 1904). The book is accessible, ably researched and well written, and even an exercise in retrostrategy for futurists seeking to understand the roles of two foresight‐based thinkers in developing long‐term strategy of the most potent reach.

To summarize, author Nicholas Thompson has reconstituted the parts played by Kennan and Nitze in the evolution of the cold war: the prolonged stand‐off between the two superpowers of the last five decades of the twentieth century. Kennan is justly recognized as the author of the American diplomatic service's “long telegram” of 1946 from the Moscow embassy; this message put Washington on its guard against the imperial intentions of the Soviet Union, denuded of all Marxist pretenses. Nitze is portrayed, on the other hand, as the contender for a vigil without let‐up against a tenacious adversary, combined with a national policy of unbeatable armament.

The author describes the wear and tear that the respective attitudes of Kennan and Nitze had on them and their adherents, as well as on their political mentors (ranging from presidents downwards), and on the public too. Kennan comes through as the unswerving intellectual, a polemicist strongly opposed to settling disputes by gunfire or worse, and instead talking one's way to peace. Nitze leaves the reader with impressions of his harsh yet practical rhetoric, an intimate knowledge of advanced weapon systems, and ever‐realistic counsel for decision makers. The two (who knew one another well) were intelligent, patriotic and loyal to the ends of their lives, but profoundly and steadfastly in disagreement as to the means required to bolster and ensure national defence.

A book for futurists

Futurists will perceive immediately that George Kennan looked at the future through the eyes of the long‐term scanner. He foresaw objectively, if one chose to accept his projection, where the Soviet Union was headed with its foreign policy and the sort of military support it needed to make Moscow's policy work – a policy that translated, most negatively, into continuing economic deprivation for the disparate peoples of the Soviet Union.

Nitze, on the other hand, was the “visioneer”: exercising political opposition to his own country's risk of lapsing into passivity, he demanded untiring defensiveness projected to the second and third degrees which, in the era of nuclear weapons, meant more potent arms and the means to deliver them to highly specific (albeit geographically dispersed) targets – and in face of ever rising costs. Nitze was neither scientist nor engineer, nor a mathematician; he acquired, by sheer concentration, a sweeping and up‐to‐date knowledge of the most complex systems of defence and offence. Her developed “a strategy of controlled escalation” (p. 187), which he sustained. Kennan, at the age of 98, counseled strongly his government in 2002 against an adventure in Iraq.

Kennan rotated in and out of government circles, alternating civil service with the work of historian accomplished at the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton. Kennan also had the distinction of being expelled by Stalin as American ambassador in Moscow. He disparaged without hesitation, furthermore, stated good intentions among his country's elected leaders. Steadfastly fearing a growing militarization of America's external political solutions, he became a prolific author whose messages appeared from time to time in reputable means of reference such Foreign Affairs and the Reith Lectures.

Nitze knew longer civil service, including a successful mandate as secretary of the navy under President John Kennedy. (Neither he nor Kennan had experienced military service.) Nitze resorted, as well, to publication of his views in well‐read media – seldom evading disagreement with Kennan and others who tended to soft‐pedal threatening approaches to the resolution of policy differences between Soviet Russia and the US‐NATO bloc. Later, in October 1986, Nitze believed that he had failed by a hair to reconcile the views of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in adopting a new treaty that would severely limit the nuclear warheads possessed by each side.

To make a story critical and complete

The author of this remarkable dual biography in public service is the grandson of one of the stars of the drama, Paul Nitze. Yet Nicholas Thompson, a critical journalist, maintains detached objectivity throughout his account, not hesitating to criticize Nitze roundly on several of the latter's manoeuvres at different moments of his remarkable career. Readers, whether futurists or not, will applaud this balanced presentation.

For those readers hungry for a wider‐ranging understanding of the foresight summoned and how decisions were reached in the acquisition of unconscionably large stocks of nuclear weapons by both superpowers, a parallel work is most helpful. This is Neil Sheehan's A Fiery Race in A Cold War, Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon (Random House, New York, 2009). It is the technological complement, seen through the eyes of military space exploiters, to Nicholas Thompson's otherwise thoroughly fascinating volume.

A About the reviewer

Jacques Richardson is the author of War, Science and Terrorism (Frank Cass, 2002). Jacques is based at Decision+Communication, Authon la Plaine, France and is on foresight's editorial board. Jacques Richardson can be contacted at: jaq.richard@noos.fr