TY  - JOUR
AB  - Asset‐backed securitization (ABS) is an interesting financial innovation whereby debt instruments backed by cash flows generated from income‐producing assets are issued for investment purposes in the capital markets. This study examines the characteristics of ABS transactions in Singapore and evaluates whether proper governance mechanisms have been developed to protect ABS investors. We examined the unique features of the Visor case, such as rental guarantee, large block ownerships of junior bonds, credit enhancement, embedded options, managerial relationships between the SPV and servicers, and critically evaluated the effects of these characteristics on the governance of ABS. Rules on separation of banks' participation in ABS and the accountant's requirement of “clean sale” that affect the ABS structure were also discussed. We also develop a simple information asymmetric model to evaluate the pecking order choice of two different financing methods: collateralized loans and ABS.
VL  - 22
IS  - 5
SN  - 1463-578X
DO  - 10.1108/14635780410556898
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/14635780410556898
AU  - Fan Gang‐Zhi
AU  - Foo Sing Tien
AU  - Eng Ong Seow
AU  - Sirmans C.F.
PY  - 2004
Y1  - 2004/01/01
TI  - Governance and optimal financing for asset‐backed securitization
T2  - Journal of Property Investment & Finance
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 414
EP  - 434
Y2  - 2024/09/25
ER  -