Oligopolistic bidding and pricing in real estate development: Experimental evidence

Abstract

Real estate developers often operate in oligopolistic environments. Pricing strategies must be made in an interactive framework that makes empirical evaluation difficult. This study appeals to economic experiments to examine how developers price their properties, especially when there is an option to market pre‐completed units. In addition, the interaction between bidding for land and pricing the end product is examined. The results indicate that competitor actions are important considerations in pricing decisions. In particular, the profit maximizing pricing strategy depends critically on being competitive, not necessarily being the most aggressive. Interestingly, pre‐completed units sell only at prices that incorporate future price expectations, and successful bids tend to precipitate more aggressive pricing. Finally, competitive bidding and pricing strategies appear to the best profit maximizing strategy.

Citation

Eng Ong, S., Jam Cheng, F., Boon, B. and Foo Sing, T. (2003), "Oligopolistic bidding and pricing in real estate development: Experimental evidence", Journal of Property Investment & Finance, Vol. 21 No. 2, pp. 154-189. https://doi.org/10.1108/14635780310469120