Fraud after Roskill: a view from the Serious Fraud Office

Abstract

Describes the 1985 Roskill Committee Report on Fraud Trials as a success: of its 112 recommendations only two were not implemented. Explains why Roskill is nevertheless often criticised: there is a lack of resources for fraud investigation, while the amount of computer‐generated data in modern fraud cases is huge, and the demands on the jury much greater. Outlines the work of the Serious Fraud Office, of which the author is Director. Asks what can be done to remedy the lack of resources, given that the number of police squads dedicated to fraud investigation has shrunk over recent years. Assesses how the nature of fraud itself has changed since Roskill: there is much more of it, it is more closely linked with general criminality, and it uses the ever more sophisticated methods of information technology. Suggests that there should be a general offence of fraud, that juries might be replaced in fraud cases, and that there should be more public education about fraud. Concludes that more emphasis on public‐private partnerships will help fight economic crime.

Citation

Wright, R. (2003), "Fraud after Roskill: a view from the Serious Fraud Office", Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 10-16. https://doi.org/10.1108/13590790410808997