Does asymmetric information drive UK dividends propensity?

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to extend and contribute to prior UK research on the association between information asymmetry and dividends propensity. It seeks to investigate the impact of the number of analysts following firms, a proxy for information asymmetry, on dividends propensity.

Design/methodology/approach

Using a 282 UK FTSE‐All Share non‐financial/non‐utilities firms with fiscal year ends on 2007, the paper uses a multiple regression model to investigate the association between dividends and analysts following.

Findings

The paper finds that after controlling for firm‐specific characteristics, there is a significant negative association between the number of analysts following firms and dividend propensity. The finding suggests that higher coverage of financial analysts for UK firms reduces levels of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, which results in lower dividend propensity. These findings are consistent with agency theory and pecking order theory, but inconsistent with signalling theory.

Originality/value

The paper contributes to prior research related to the drivers of dividend propensity by being the first UK study to examine the association between dividend propensity and information asymmetry.

Citation

Basiddiq, H. and Hussainey, K. (2012), "Does asymmetric information drive UK dividends propensity?", Journal of Applied Accounting Research, Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 284-297. https://doi.org/10.1108/09675421211281344