The Tobin tax and Newcomb's paradox

Dominique Besson (I.A.E., Lille, France)
Alexis Downs (Department of AIS, Emporia State University, Emporia, Kansas, USA)
Rita Durant (Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama, USA)
Marco Roman (Mount St Mary's University, Emmitsburg, Maryland, USA)

Journal of Organizational Change Management

ISSN: 0953-4814

Publication date: 1 July 2006

Abstract

Purpose

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The purpose of this paper is to examine proposals for a Tobin tax to curb currency speculation in global markets.

Design/methodology/approach

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Financial markets are viewed from the perspective of Michel Serres.

Findings

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Managing volatility is really about managing relationships that can buffer governments against risk. The resolution of a paradox is embracing the paradox.

Originality/value

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The work of Michel Serres has not previously been used in analyses of global currency markets. His theory of parasitical relationships offers a novel response to proposals for a Tobin tax.

Keywords

Citation

Besson, D., Downs, A., Durant, R. and Roman, M. (2006), "The Tobin tax and Newcomb's paradox", Journal of Organizational Change Management, Vol. 19 No. 4, pp. 529-540. https://doi.org/10.1108/09534810610676716

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Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2006, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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