God, souls, and Turing: in defense of the theological objection to the Turing test

Abstract

Purpose

It is widely known that when Turing first introduced his “imitation‐game” test for ascertaining whether a computing machine can think, he considered, and found wanting, a series of objections to his position. It seems safe to say that one of these objections, the “theological objection” (TO), is regarded by Turing to be positively anemic, and that ever since he delivered his rapid (purported!) refutation over half a century ago, the received view has been that, indeed, this objection is as weak as can be. The purpose of this paper is to show that TO is not the pushover Turing, and others since, take it to be.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper is devoted to the TO within the Turing test (TT) and to Turing's reply to this objection.

Findings

The paper reaches the conclusion that Turing's response to TO fails.

Originality/value

This paper is a defense of the TO to the TT.

Citation

Bringsjord, S. (2010), "God, souls, and Turing: in defense of the theological objection to the Turing test", Kybernetes, Vol. 39 No. 3, pp. 414-422. https://doi.org/10.1108/03684921011036141