Moral invention in meaning‐constituting systems

Abstract

Purpose

To present the concept of moral invention as discussed by philosopher Paul Ricoeur and to examine how the selections operated by systems described by Niklas Luhmann as meaning‐constituting systems allow for the emergence of distinctions that would qualify as moral invention.

Design/methodology/approach

Ricoeur's philosophical position on ethics and morality is rooted in Husserlian phenomenology. So is Niklas Luhmann's description of meaning‐constituting systems and his discussion of their capacity to produce meaningful distinctions, including ethico‐moral ones. An interdisciplinary approach is used in order to highlight the conditions under which moral invention could become possible. In order to provide grounds for further discussions across disciplines, the extensive use of quotations is deemed necessary so that the material referred to can be traced back within Luhmann's extensive corpus, written and published in many languages.

Findings

Propositions are formulated as comments following the presentation of three of Luhmann's statements about meaning. These propositions indicate how meaning‐constituting systems could make distinctions or selections that would qualify as moral inventions.

Originality/value

To shows how second‐order cybernetics and philosophy, using as a common basis a description of meaning inspired by Husserlian phenomenology, can develop complementary propositions about ethics and morality.

Citation

Laflamme, D. (2006), "Moral invention in meaning‐constituting systems", Kybernetes, Vol. 35 No. 7/8, pp. 1210-1222. https://doi.org/10.1108/03684920610675184