Considerable confusion reigns as to whether social rights are genuine rights and whether they are justiciable, that is to say whether they are subject to scrutiny by the courts ‐ and, if so, to what extent. The confusion is kept alive not to say enhanced by a large number of legal writers who, for ideological reasons, will not accept that social rights are full rights in themselves and will not even reconcile themselves to the fact that they are part of positive law. I believe therefore that it is important ‐ indeed high time ‐ for us, firstly, to review the various arguments put forward ‐ particularly by German writers ‐ and examine them from a purely legal viewpoint in order to show that social rights are justiciable and, secondly, to highlight the “structural” characteristics of social rights which lend their justiciability certain distinctive traits.
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