Self‐interest and sympathy in economic behaviour

Abstract

Analyses self‐interest and sympathy in game‐theoretic terms. Evaluates the relative weight of self‐interest and sympathy in the theories of Hobbes, Hume and Adam Smith in an economic framework. Demonstrates through game‐theoretic tools that sympathy as an actuating motive in human nature gives rise to human interaction having other and, for organizations and societies, more beneficial characteristics than does merely self‐interested interaction. Uses the emphasis on the time factor and the importance of the future in Hume’s more than in Hobbes’ theory to show how co‐operation can emerge in large organizations. Introduces government or an organizational structure to further induce co‐operative behaviour.

Citation

Hausken, K. (1996), "Self‐interest and sympathy in economic behaviour", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 23 No. 7, pp. 4-24. https://doi.org/10.1108/03068299610122371