Researchers of legislative behavior have attempted to explain the decisions of legislators for some time. Public choice scholars have argued that legislators will “sell” political favors in exchange for some from of interest group payment that is thought to benefit the legislator's electoral ambitions. Yet, legislators do not appear to receive the full value of their political favor in these exchanges. That is, the value of the policies offered appears to exceed the price paid by interest groups in the form of campaign contributions, speaking honoraria and other material payments. This imbalance has led some scholars to discount theories that explain legislative behavior motivated by material gain. However, to the extent that legislators value post‐elective employment opportunities, interest groups have an incentive to use the offer of future employment as a payment for present legislative influence. In this sense, perhaps a large portion of the difference in payments can be accounted for in the post‐elective employment careers of elected politicians. In this paper, I explore and explain this theory using a political market model and attempt to identify several attributes that I believe will be common among “prospect‐legislators” whose behavior is principally motivated by concerns with post‐elective life.
Troy Gibson, M. (2003), "Future employment promises as rent seeking in representative government", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 30 No. 1/2, pp. 73-94. https://doi.org/10.1108/03068290310453619Download as .RIS
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