TY  - JOUR
AB  - Proposes a model which shows that Stackelberg competition is not necessarily welfare‐ enhancing compared with Cournot competition. Shows that, although in a simple duopoly model prices in a Stackelberg equilibrium are lower than in a Cournot equilibrium, this is not necessarily true in an entry‐deterrence framework, where post‐entry competition is Stackelberg rather than Cournot. Derives conditions under which in this framework Stackelberg competition leads to lower expected welfare, in the case where demand is linear.
VL  - 23
IS  - 5/6
SN  - 0144-3585
DO  - 10.1108/01443589610154090
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/01443589610154090
AU  - Haan Marco
AU  - Maks Hans
PY  - 1996
Y1  - 1996/01/01
TI  - Stackelberg and Cournot competition under equilibrium limit pricing
T2  - Journal of Economic Studies
PB  - MCB UP Ltd
SP  - 110
EP  - 127
Y2  - 2024/04/25
ER  -