TY  - JOUR
AB  - Solves von Stackelberg equilibria in a Bertrand‐Edgeworth duopoly game. Shows that, initially, the environment is characterized by efficient rationing and capacity constraints. Since interest lies in sustaining monopoly outcomes from non‐co‐operative behaviour, introduces the buyout option, where rivals can absorb one another’s output before any consumer. Reveals that the outcomes change drastically in that players together are able to reach the monopoly profits.
VL  - 23
IS  - 5/6
SN  - 0144-3585
DO  - 10.1108/01443589610154081
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/01443589610154081
AU  - Van Cayseele Patrick
AU  - Furth Dave
PY  - 1996
Y1  - 1996/01/01
TI  - von Stackelberg’s equilibria for Bertrand‐Edgeworth duopoly with buyouts
T2  - Journal of Economic Studies
PB  - MCB UP Ltd
SP  - 96
EP  - 109
Y2  - 2024/09/19
ER  -