TY - JOUR AB - Generalizes existing models of credit markets under asymmetric information. The general model accommodates the adverse selection arguments of Stiglitz and Weiss and the favourable selection arguments of de Meza and Webb, and contains their models as special cases. Market equilibrium may exhibit credit rationing, while aggregate investment may be above or below the firstā€best level. A novel issue presented is that inefficiencies may involve not merely the volume of investment but also its composition. VL - 19 IS - 3 SN - 0144-3585 DO - 10.1108/01443589210027257 UR - https://doi.org/10.1108/01443589210027257 AU - Hillier Brian AU - Ibrahimo M.V. PY - 1992 Y1 - 1992/01/01 TI - The Performance of Credit Markets under Asymmetric Information about Project Means and Variances T2 - Journal of Economic Studies PB - MCB UP Ltd Y2 - 2024/03/28 ER -