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A Differential Game Model of Canada′s Pacific Halibut Fishery

Journal of Economic Studies

ISSN: 0144-3585

Article publication date: 1 April 1992

Abstract

Models Canada′s Pacific halibut fishery as a non‐zero‐sun non‐co‐operative differential game. Optimal harvesting level are derived under the criterion of profit maximization. Show that optimal aggregate steady‐state fishing effort and yield increase with the number of fishermen harvesting the stock. The model provides a better explanation of what has actual occurred in this fishery than an optimal control model, which may be considered as a game with one player.

Keywords

Citation

Chappell, D., Dury, K. and Straker, C. (1992), "A Differential Game Model of Canada′s Pacific Halibut Fishery", Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 19 No. 4. https://doi.org/10.1108/01443589210021415

Publisher

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MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1992, MCB UP Limited