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A Differential Game Model of Canada′s Pacific Halibut Fishery

Journal of Economic Studies

ISSN: 0144-3585

Article publication date: 1 April 1992


Models Canada′s Pacific halibut fishery as a non‐zero‐sun non‐co‐operative differential game. Optimal harvesting level are derived under the criterion of profit maximization. Show that optimal aggregate steady‐state fishing effort and yield increase with the number of fishermen harvesting the stock. The model provides a better explanation of what has actual occurred in this fishery than an optimal control model, which may be considered as a game with one player.



Chappell, D., Dury, K. and Straker, C. (1992), "A Differential Game Model of Canada′s Pacific Halibut Fishery", Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 19 No. 4.




Copyright © 1992, MCB UP Limited