Careers in a judicial hierarchy

Martin Schneider (Institute of Labor Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community, University of Trier, Trier, Germany)

International Journal of Manpower

ISSN: 0143-7720

Publication date: 1 July 2004

Abstract

This paper analyzes the careers of 230 professional judges in the German labor court system. Judges who are promoted early for the first time – “fast starters” – are more likely to be promoted for the second time. Fast starters, however, do not achieve a second promotion earlier – there is no evidence of a fast career track. Furthermore, judges who publish scientific books or papers are more likely to be promoted for the second time. Hence, careers neither are random nor do they follow bureaucratic criteria such as seniority. They can be understood as the outcome of a succession of tournaments for promotion that sustains career prospects both for “fast starters” and for “late bloomers”. Implications for judicial incentives and the quality of matching of judges with judicial offices are inferred.

Keywords

Citation

Schneider, M. (2004), "Careers in a judicial hierarchy", International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 25 No. 5, pp. 431-446. https://doi.org/10.1108/01437720410554142

Publisher

:

Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2004, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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