Ostracism in work teams: a public good experiment

David Masclet (GATE, Ecully, France)

International Journal of Manpower

ISSN: 0143-7720

Publication date: 1 November 2003

Abstract

This paper provides an experimental examination of the effects of ostracism on cooperation. Ostracism is one of the most radical forms of peer pressure. More generally, ostracism is the exclusion of disapproved individuals from interaction with a social group. By performing a laboratory experiment involving a public good game with exclusion, the paper provides empirical evidence that threats of exclusion increase contributions. The results show that subjects exclude their peers for two reasons. Subjects are willing to punish unfair behaviors (non‐strategic reason) and expect changes in behavior in response to exclusions (strategic reason).

Keywords

Citation

Masclet, D. (2003), "Ostracism in work teams: a public good experiment", International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 24 No. 7, pp. 867-887. https://doi.org/10.1108/01437720310502177

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Publisher

:

MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 2003, MCB UP Limited

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