TY  - JOUR
AB  - The paper is concerned with dynamic job assignment when observed performance is an imperfect signal of the worker's type. When the rate of learning from past performance depends upon the particular job performed, promotion can be due to good performance only at a job for which the resulting probability of mistaking a low‐ability type for a high‐ability type is higher than for the job the worker is upgraded to. Income risk can be greater for old workers than for young workers. The length of the worker's active life is relevant for job mobility notwithstanding optimal myopic procedures for job assignment. The dynamic perspective induced by learning can generate new forms of opportunism.
VL  - 24
IS  - 7
SN  - 0143-7720
DO  - 10.1108/01437720310502168
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/01437720310502168
AU  - Valsecchi Irene
PY  - 2003
Y1  - 2003/01/01
TI  - Job assignment and bandit problems
T2  - International Journal of Manpower
PB  - MCB UP Ltd
SP  - 844
EP  - 866
Y2  - 2024/05/12
ER  -