Decision processes, monitoring, incentives and large firm performance in the UK

Abstract

In large firms the managers who run the business tend not to be large shareholders. In addition, managers are said to have objectives which differ from those of the owners. Aligning these conflicting interests is the basis of the agency problem. Various corporate governance schemes have been introduced to ensure that managers follow profit‐driven policies. Looks at the separation of decision management from decision control, the frequency of meetings between divisional managers and their superiors, performance‐related pay and performance‐related incentives. Examines their impact on firm profitability. Finds that the level of monitoring of divisional managers and the use of divisional performance‐related pay has a significant effect on performance. Finds incentives in general do not affect performance. Finds on average that performance is unaffected by the separation of decision processes, although it does help to achieve very good profitability.

Citation

Evans, J. and Weir, C. (1995), "Decision processes, monitoring, incentives and large firm performance in the UK", Management Decision, Vol. 33 No. 6, pp. 32-38. https://doi.org/10.1108/00251749510087632