TY  - JOUR
AB  - This paper examines the contract design problem of microfinance institutions seeking to maximize outreach to the poor while remaining financially sustainable. A dynamic model of group lending is developed that shows how optimal interest rates depend on information regarding moral hazard and adverse selection problems, correlated project risks, and strategic default. Relative to traditional static models, the results indicate a dynamic model better explains the current experience with individual and group lending in developing countries.
VL  - 66
IS  - 2
SN  - 0002-1466
DO  - 10.1108/00214660680001190
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/00214660680001190
AU  - Katchova Ani L.
AU  - Miranda Mario J.
AU  - Gonzalez‐Vega Claudio
PY  - 2006
Y1  - 2006/01/01
TI  - A dynamic model of individual and group lending in developing countries
T2  - Agricultural Finance Review
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 251
EP  - 265
Y2  - 2024/04/25
ER  -