Corporate governance mechanisms and performance related CEO turnover

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on performance related turnover. Our results indicate that smaller boards and institutional block holders are positively related to the likelihood of performance related turnover. CEOs that also hold the position of the chairman of the board or belong to a founding family face lower likelihood of turnover. CEO stock ownership is negatively related to turnover and CEOs who own 3 percent or more of their company stock face a significantly lower likelihood of performance related turnover. Moreover, protection from external control market has no effect either on the likelihood of turnover.

Citation

Chakraborty, A. and Sheikh, S. (2008), "Corporate governance mechanisms and performance related CEO turnover", Choi, J.J. and Dow, S. (Ed.) Institutional Approach to Global Corporate Governance: Business Systems and Beyond (International Finance Review, Vol. 9), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 143-161. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3767(08)09007-9

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