TY  - CHAP
AB  - This paper sets up a model of strategic sovereign default, in which crony capitalism provides policymakers with incentives to service the debt beyond what is socially optimal. It then considers reforms to deal with the supply side of clientelism: the private sector. This involves tackling agency problems between managers and corporate stakeholders, since a key element to constrain the ability of powerful economic interests to capture the state is good corporate governance. Economic hard times provide such an opportunity, as the implicit coalition between groups of cronies may break down. A model is built along those lines, which highlights international contagion of debt repudiation.
VL  - 9
SN  - 978-0-76231-133-0, 978-1-84950-289-4/1569-3732
DO  - 10.1016/S1569-3732(04)09006-1
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3732(04)09006-1
AU  - Vaugirard Victor
ED  - Mark Hirschey
ED  - Kose John and
ED  - Anil  K. Makhija
PY  - 2004
Y1  - 2004/01/01
TI  - CLIENTELISM, DEBT SERVICE AND GOVERNANCE
T2  - Corporate Governance
T3  - Advances in Financial Economics
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 137
EP  - 160
Y2  - 2024/04/25
ER  -