CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SINGAPORE: THE IMPACT OF DIRECTORS’ EQUITY OWNERSHIP

Abstract

We examine whether the curvilinear relationship between directors’ equity ownership and firm performance exists in a non-Western economy such as Singapore. We find that it does, although the inflection points are much higher than that generally cited for U.S. firms. We then compare this relationship across two kinds of firms that are not common to the U.S. marketplace. We observe for founder-controlled firms that the impact of director ownership is insignificant. We also examine government-linked corporations and in spite of the presence of a government blockholder, find that the pattern of alignment, entrenchment and then alignment remains operative.

Citation

Bhabra, G.S., Ferris, S.P., Sen, N. and Peck Yen, P. (2003), "CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SINGAPORE: THE IMPACT OF DIRECTORS’ EQUITY OWNERSHIP", Advances in Financial Economics (Advances in Financial Economics, Vol. 8), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 29-46. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1569-3732(03)08002-2