TY  - CHAP
AB  - In much of philosophy and social theory since classical antiquity, human belief and reason have been placed in the driving seat of individual action. In particular, social theory has often taken it for granted, or even by definition, that action is motivated by reasons based on beliefs. In contrast, a minority has criticized the adoption of this ‘folk psychology’ that explains human action wholly in such ‘mind first’ terms. Critics point out that such explanations are a mere gloss on a much more complex neurophysiological reality. These dualistic and ‘mind-first’ explanations of human behavior are unable to explain adequately such phenomena as sleep, memory, learning, mental illness, or the effects of chemicals or drugs on our perceptions or actions (Bunge, 1980; Churchland, 1984, 1989; Churchland, 1986; Rosenberg, 1995, 1998; Kilpinen, 2000).
VL  - 9
SN  - 978-1-84950-465-2, 978-0-76231-378-5/1529-2134
DO  - 10.1016/S1529-2134(06)09005-3
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/S1529-2134(06)09005-3
AU  - Hodgson Geoffrey M.
ED  - Elisabeth Krecké
ED  - Carine Krecké
ED  - Roger G. Koppl
PY  - 2006
Y1  - 2006/01/01
TI  - Instinct and Habit Before Reason: Comparing the Views of John Dewey, Friedrich Hayek and Thorstein Veblen
T2  - Cognition and Economics
T3  - Advances in Austrian Economics
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 109
EP  - 143
Y2  - 2024/05/12
ER  -