SHOULD ETHNOGRAPHERS BE AGAINST INEQUALITY? ON BECKER, VALUE NEUTRALITY, AND RESEARCHER PARTISANSHIP

Abstract

There is a huge amount of social and educational research concerned with various kinds of inequality. Much of this research assumes that inequalities are a bad thing, even when it is solely concerned with providing information about the level and causes of inequalities of some particular kind.¹ Sometimes, however, this use of crude egalitarianism spills over into presentation of what can be read as practical value judgements. Ambiguity between factual conclusion and practical evaluation is frequently exploited, or at least allowed to prevail. As a result, evaluations seem to be expressed, and/or prescriptions for action proposed, with the implication that they are justified by research evidence. Yet, on its own, research evidence can rarely provide a sufficient justification for value conclusions (see Foster et al., 2000; Hammersley, 2003a). While on some occasions research evidence may be treated as pointing directly to value conclusions, there are always value premisses involved, as well as factual ones, and these will often be open to reasonable doubt and disagreement.

Citation

Hammersley, M. (2004), "SHOULD ETHNOGRAPHERS BE AGAINST INEQUALITY? ON BECKER, VALUE NEUTRALITY, AND RESEARCHER PARTISANSHIP", Jeffrey, B. and Walford, G. (Ed.) Ethnographies of Educational and Cultural Conflicts: Strategies and Resolutions (Studies in Educational Ethnography, Vol. 9), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 25-43. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1529-210X(04)09003-5