An Experiment of Group Association, Firm Performance, and Decision Dissemination Influences on Compensation

Abstract

Reports citing excessive CEO compensation continue to make the news with evidence of peer relationships between the CEO and the compensation committee often the center of debate. The compensation committee of the board of directors determines CEO pay and is often comprises CEOs from other companies as well as non-CEOs such as academic, exgovernment, and professional individuals. This study examines the influence of the psychological factor of social comparison over accounting performance measures in a compensation experiment with 176 subjects. The results of this study are consistent with social comparison theory in that CEO director-subjects award greater pay and shield the compensation of the CEO when firm accounting performance is below average. Additionally, we find shielding is mitigated when subjects are informed that the decision of the amount of compensation awarded will be revealed to the public.

Citation

Fleming, A.S. and Barkhi, R. (2007), "An Experiment of Group Association, Firm Performance, and Decision Dissemination Influences on Compensation", Lee, J.Y. and Epstein, M.J. (Ed.) Advances in Management Accounting (Advances in Management Accounting, Vol. 16), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 287-309. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1474-7871(07)16010-X