We argue that national security is a public good and its production can be analyzed in a strategic context. We first present the context of the border between Canada and the United States. Next, we discuss the options of status quo and adoption of a common security perimeter relative to sovereignty and security. We show that efficient border policies could require cooperation among countries but motivating such collaboration may be difficult since joint border security policies may involve a prisoners’ dilemma problem. On the other hand, we show that the likelihood of joint increased security will be higher if there are country-specific benefits for a country improving security at its border. If this is the case, we demonstrate it is possible to reach optimal security using independent border policies.
Tanguay, G.A. and Therrien, M.-C. (2004), "PROTECTING CANADA AND THE U.S. AGAINST TERRORISM: A COMMON SECURITY PERIMETER?", Rugman, A.M. (Ed.) North American Economic and Financial Integration (Research in Global Strategic Management, Vol. 10), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 85-96. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1064-4857(04)10005-3
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