Interdependent preferences in the design of equal-opportunity policies
Inequality and Opportunity: Papers from the Second ECINEQ Society Meeting
ISBN: 978-1-84855-134-3, eISBN: 978-1-84855-135-0
Publication date: 15 October 2008
Abstract
We study mechanisms to construct equal-opportunity policies for resource allocation. In our model, agents enjoy welfare as a function of the effort they expend and the amount of a socially provided resource they consume. Nevertheless, agents have interdependent preferences, that is, they not only care about their own allocation, but also about their peers’ allocations. As in the standard approach to equality of opportunity, the aim is to allocate the social resource so that welfare across individuals at the same relative effort level is as equal as possible. We show how pursuing this same aim while assuming that agents have interdependent preferences might crucially alter the results.
Citation
Moreno-Ternero, J.D. (2008), "Interdependent preferences in the design of equal-opportunity policies", Bishop, J. and Zheng, B. (Ed.) Inequality and Opportunity: Papers from the Second ECINEQ Society Meeting (Research on Economic Inequality, Vol. 16), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 49-65. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1049-2585(08)16003-3
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2008, Emerald Group Publishing Limited