TY  - CHAP
AB  - The literature on household behavior contains hardly any empirical research on the within-household distributional effects of tax-benefit policies. We simulate this effect in the framework of a collective model of labor supply when shifting from a joint to an individual taxation system in France. We show that the net-of-tax relative earning potential of the wife is a significant determinant of intrahousehold negotiation but with very low elasticity. Consequently, the labor supply responses to the reform are essentially driven by the traditional substitution and income effects as in a unitary model. For some households only, the reform alters the intrahousehold distribution in a way that tends to change normative conclusions. A sensitivity analysis shows that the distributional effects captured by the collective model would be significant only for reforms both radical and of extended scope.
VL  - 14
SN  - 978-0-7623-1374-7, 978-1-84950-462-1/1049-2585
DO  - 10.1016/S1049-2585(06)14015-6
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/S1049-2585(06)14015-6
AU  - Bargain Olivier
AU  - Moreau Nicolas
ED  - John Bishop
ED  - Yoram Amiel
PY  - 2007
Y1  - 2007/01/01
TI  - Does Taxation Affect Intrahousehold Distribution? A Simulation Approach
T2  - Inequality and Poverty
T3  - Research on Economic Inequality
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 317
EP  - 344
Y2  - 2024/04/23
ER  -