Collusion and collective action in the patent system: A proposal for patent bounties

Abstract

Persistent commentary contends that the Patent Office is issuing patents that appropriate public domain concepts at an alarming frequency. This article describes the forces that have rendered the Patent Office an increasingly porous agency. It next reviews existing proposals for improving patent quality, including the conventional wisdom that an opposition system would contribute meaningfully to the solution of our patent quality problem. This article instead proposes that the Patent Office recruit members of the public to act as private patent examiners. By awarding informants with a bounty assessed against applicants, the Patent Office can reduce the social costs of the patent system.

Citation

Thomas, J.R. (2001), "Collusion and collective action in the patent system: A proposal for patent bounties", Libecap, G.D. (Ed.) Entrepreneurial inputs and outcomes: New studies of entrepreneurship in the United States (Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Economic Growth, Vol. 13), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 95-132. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-4736(01)13006-7