Estimating Pricing Games in the Wheat-handling Market in Saskatchewan: The Role of a Major Cooperative

Abstract

In Canada, grain handling is an important agri-business that has traditionally been cooperative in nature (for example, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool). At the same time the industry is heavily regulated. There has been a dramatic change in the structure of the industry over the past 20 years and there are currently no major cooperatives present in the market. If the “yardstick effect” hypothesis of the role of cooperatives in an imperfectly competitive market is true, the disappearance of cooperatives could result in the ability of remaining firms to exercise market power over producers. To investigate the impact of changes in ownership structure in the market, we estimated two types of pricing games that might have been played between a cooperative, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP) and an investor-owned firm (IOF), Pioneer Grain (PG) in the Saskatchewan wheat-handling market over the period 1980–2004, with different assumptions about their pricing behavior imposed. We find that SWP and PG have likely been playing a Bertrand pricing game in the market over the period. We thus conclude that SWP, as the largest cooperative in the market, likely played a “yardstick effect” role in the market.

Citation

Zhang, J., Goddard, E. and Lerohl, M. (2007), "Estimating Pricing Games in the Wheat-handling Market in Saskatchewan: The Role of a Major Cooperative", Novkovic, S. and Sena, V. (Ed.) Cooperative Firms in Global Markets (Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory & Labor-Managed Firms, Vol. 10), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 151-182. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0885-3339(06)10006-X