Worker Absenteeism Under Voluntary and Compulsory Sickness Insurance: Continental Europe, 1885–1908

Abstract

Prior to widespread social insurance, European governments experimented with a variety of programs to protect workers from income loss due to illness. This paper examines the consequences for worker absenteeism of making sickness insurance coverage voluntary or compulsory. Medical benefits appear to have reduced absenteeism for all workers. The effect of paid sick leave depended on insurance fund membership status. Better-paid workers found it easier to take time off in compulsory than in voluntary funds. Distinctive information problems plagued voluntary systems, and eventually were resolved by rejecting the voluntary ideal and forcing all workers into a single risk pool.

Citation

Murray, J.E. (2006), "Worker Absenteeism Under Voluntary and Compulsory Sickness Insurance: Continental Europe, 1885–1908", Field, A.J., Clark, G. and Sundstrom, W.A. (Ed.) Research in Economic History (Research in Economic History, Vol. 23), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 177-207. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0363-3268(05)23005-7