The size of the U.S. armed forces during World War II: Feasibility and war planning

Abstract

The size of the American armed forces in World War II resulted from early decisions which reflected the nature of the threat, the capital intensity of American combat strategy, the immediate need to aid the heavily engaged Allies, and the degree of American popular commitment. A key decision followed the feasibility dispute of 1942. In this dispute the immense supply demands of the President, the War Department and the Navy Department were challenged by the GNP and labor force analysis of Simon Kuznets and Robert Nathan of the War Production Board. Based on an examination of War Production Board documents, this paper shows how Kuznets and Nathan used the infant theory and practice of GNP accounting to frame the case for the infeasibility of the first war plans. Kuznets and Nathan not only had an immediate impact on war spending in 1942 and 1943 but the standard of living constraint that they identified remained a crucial element in the economic shape of America's entire war.

Citation

Edelstein, M. (2001), "The size of the U.S. armed forces during World War II: Feasibility and war planning", Research in Economic History (Research in Economic History, Vol. 20), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 47-97. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0363-3268(01)20003-2