TY  - CHAP
AB  - We examine the effects of pre-play communication in an experimental game with conflicting risk-dominant and payoff-dominant equilibria. We find that most players condition their choices on the messages received, and do so in an intuitive way, announcing an intention to play the payoff-dominant action, and choosing the payoff-dominant action if the opponent expresses the same intention. However, a significant minority of players misrepresent their intentions. In some sessions where these players appear, behavior converges to an equilibrium in which subjects misrepresent their intentions and play the risk-dominant equilibrium.
VL  - 13
SN  - 978-0-76231-194-1, 978-1-84950-337-2/0278-0984
DO  - 10.1016/S0278-0984(05)13003-X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/S0278-0984(05)13003-X
AU  - Burton Anthony
AU  - Loomes Graham
AU  - Sefton Martin
ED  - John Morgan
PY  - 2005
Y1  - 2005/01/01
TI  - Communication and Efficiency in Coordination Game Experiments
T2  - Experimental and Behavorial Economics
T3  - Advances in Applied Microeconomics
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 63
EP  - 85
Y2  - 2024/04/25
ER  -