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Race and radio: Preference externalities, minority ownership, and the provision of programming to minorities

Advertising and Differentiated Products

ISBN: 978-0-76230-823-1, eISBN: 978-1-84950-124-8

Publication date: 4 October 2001

Abstract

Market provision of radio programming is beset by possible inefficient underprovision of formats that appeal to small audiences, for which the social benefits of programming — but not advertising revenue — exceed their costs. Larger markets have more programming, so their listeners derive benefits from being in the same market as others with similar preferences, a mechanism we term “preference externalities.” Yet, because white and minority content preferences are substantially different, preference externalities are positive only within group. We expect problems of inefficient underprovision to be more likely for small minority populations. We find evidence that policies promoting minority ownership increase the amount of minority-targeted programming.

Citation

Siegelman, P. and Waldfogel, J. (2001), "Race and radio: Preference externalities, minority ownership, and the provision of programming to minorities", Baye, M.R. and Nelson, J.P. (Ed.) Advertising and Differentiated Products (Advances in Applied Microeconomics, Vol. 10), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 73-107. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0278-0984(01)10005-2

Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2001, Emerald Group Publishing Limited