IMPLIED VOLATILITIES AND AUDITOR REPUTATION: THE ANDERSEN CASE

Abstract

Audits are a means of reducing the information asymmetry between managers and investors. If the quality of the audit is in question, outside investors may face a larger informational disadvantage. We test the hypothesis that this informational disadvantage is manifested in the implied volatilities associated with the equity options of the audited firms. We find that volatilities increased for Andersen audited firms relative to firms audited by other Big Five accounting firms. This finding is consistent with the view that auditors help lessen the information asymmetry problem and that some of this reduction is accomplished by auditor reputation.

Citation

Godbey, J.M. and Mahar, J.W. (2005), "IMPLIED VOLATILITIES AND AUDITOR REPUTATION: THE ANDERSEN CASE", Research in Finance (Research in Finance, Vol. 21), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 93-111. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0196-3821(04)21004-8